The New Afghanistan

NATO forces handily defeated insurgent forces as they took over the Afghan Taliban stronghold of Marja in the unstable province of Helmand on the Pakistani border last month. They installed a new government, one they believed could hold the area even as U.S.-led military forces slowly handed over the policing to local forces. Marja was a shining star in the American “surge” that was bringing the battle back to the Taliban’s front door, a policy that would confront these fundamentalists and at least set the stage for some tough bargaining with them as NATO forces began the anticipated troop reduction in the near term. I suggested that the Taliban could and did simply wait across the border in the safe havens in the Pakistan for the allies to depart, returning without having to lose troops in this angry war, but I was wrong…and not in a good way.

Combined with thousands of Afghan troops, over 6,000 NATO soldiers took over this region in mid-February. With one allied soldier for every eight local residents, the prevailing theory was that at least during this intensive NATO military occupation, the Taliban would not dare attempt reasserting their power over the city. The prevailing theory was wrong. The day belongs to NATO, but the night belongs to the Taliban, who are shaking out horrific threats – punctuated by at least one gruesome beheading – at the local residents. “‘After dark the city is like the kingdom of the Taliban,’ said a tribal elder living in Marja, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of the Taliban. ‘The government and international forces cannot defend anyone even one kilometer from their bases.’… The new governor of Marja, Haji Abdul Zahir [pictured above], said the militants were now holding meetings in randomly selected homes roughly every other night, gathering residents together and demanding that they turn over the names of anyone cooperating with the authorities.

“Mr. Zahir said the Taliban also regularly issued ‘night letters,’ posted at mosques or on utility poles, warning against such collaboration, and often intimidated residents into providing them with shelter and food, even in densely populated neighborhoods of the city, which has a population of 80,000… ‘They are threatening and intimidating these people who are cooperating,’ he said in a telephone interview. ‘They have been involved in the area for a long time and they know how to intimidate people. They threaten them with beheadings, cutting off hands and feet, all the things they did when they were the government.’… Mr. Zahir said it was difficult for the authorities to counter the Taliban’s campaign because the militants were mostly moving around without guns, relying on fear rather than threats. ‘If they are detained, they claim they are just ordinary citizens,’ he said. ‘At the same time, they still have a lot of sympathy among the people.’… He said it was impossible to estimate how many Taliban fighters remained in the city. ‘It’s like an ant hole,’ he said. ‘When you look into an ant hole, who knows how many ants there are?’” March 18^th New York Times.

To make matters worse, what little effort Pakistan has made on our behalf (and for their own cause and as to local Taliban who have focused their attacks inside Pakistan itself) may actually have made them less valuable as intermediaries to the Afghan Taliban: “Kai Eide, the former special representative in Afghanistan for the United Nations secretary general, told the BBC in an interview broadcast on [March 19^th] that, for the past year, the United Nations had been quietly involved in early discussions with the Taliban in Dubai. He said those talks were upended by the arrests of senior Taliban leaders [by Pakistani authorities], including the group’s second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in February… Mr. Eide, who stepped down earlier this month, said the arrests undermined efforts to start talks and to build trust that are necessary for substantive peace negotiations… ‘The Pakistanis did not play the role that they should have played,’ he said in the interview…” March 20^th New York Times. Pakistan denied this impasse and indicated that they are still involved in an Afghan-led reconciliation effort with the Taliban leadership.

With corruption in Kabul, internecine tribalism almost everywhere in Afghanistan, civilian casualties still mounting – albeit at a lower rate than before new “civilian-sensitive” military policies were implemented – and Pakistan’s populace, military and intelligence services still showing an obvious sympathy for the Muslim Taliban despite their ostensible alliance with the U.S. against such forces, the debacle in Marja is just one more piece of evidence in an overwhelming litany of proof that unless the United States is prepared both to expand its military presence over a very long, almost indefinite term – perhaps even risking incursions directly into Pakistan (which will enrage Pakistan) – the effort in Afghanistan is both unwinnable and only serves to focus region anger on the Western world. Our efforts – widely interpreted as a war on Islam – are the recruiting tool for Islamists everywhere. It was not without ironic glee that Pakistan arrested five American citizens from Virginia – Muslim fundamentalists by their own actions – and charged them with supporting terrorism.

Our “surge” seems only seems to prove to the local Afghans that the Taliban are only getting stronger. At what point does the United States government actually stop “throwing good money after bad” and allowing the slaughter of human lives (including U.S. forces)? At what point does the back-channel peace process yield the slightest dividend? At what point does our government recognize the obvious? We need our soldiers here and the money wasted on this unwinnable war to be used to rebuild this nation here at home.

I’m Peter Dekom, and sometimes you have to fight a war… and sometimes you shouldn’t.