The Lebanese Squeeze

A confluence of change is sweeping the Middle East. The Arab Spring and the resulting elections in Tunisia and Egypt (and the subsequent military takeover today) have altered the political landscape, a plus for democracy but not necessarily an advancement of American interests. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, leaving a Shiite majority in a rear-guard conflict with remaining Sunnis and Kurds, cozying up to Iran like a promiscuous slut, and its failure to curtail the Afghan Taliban and the opium that finances their subversion leave the United States with dwindling power in the region. And it is into this power vacuum that Iran lunged, carrying huge military and financial aid to anyone willing to call themselves an ally.

There are not a lot of Shiites in the Islamic world. Since the movement began very shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, it has been persecuted by the majority Sunnis (85% of the Muslim faith) for the former’s perceived heretical views that the Qur’an is not to be read literally as the word of God but is instead a mystical message from Allah that only religious leaders (Imam and Ayatollahs) can interpret. So when Shiite Iran, seemingly relegated to brotherly ethnic connections to nations with Shiite majorities (like Iraq), Shiite (or quasi-Shiite) leadership even where Sunni majorities exist (like Syria) or large Shiite populations (like Lebanon), the potential reconfiguration of these Shiite locals because of these earth-shaking changes is a threat to Iran’s goal of becoming and remaining the regional power in the Middle East… at least in their minds.

And what is happening in Syria – Iran’s brother in arms and most certainly a conduit to its Shiite allies in Lebanon (on the other side of Syria) – threatens to pry away Iran’s seeming hold on Lebanon and its Iranian-supported Hezbollah-elected government, led by a Harvard-educated telecom billionaire premiere, Najib Mikati, himself a Sunni (an anomaly, in leading what is effectively an anti-Zionist Shiite party labeled by the United States and a number of its allies as a terrorist organization). Mikati’s brand of leadership has moved Hezbollah to “Hezbollah light.” The Lebanese capital, Beirut, has become a major party town, with the sound of mainstream Western bands resonating from the rooftop clubs that have exploded in Beirut. The visions of Lebanese modernity, a mixture of Christian Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites and a few Druse, permissiveness in a conservative part of the world, flies in the face of Iran’s theocratic repression.

Iran has spent fortunes financing and arming Hezbollah in Lebanon, and unlike Iraq – with which Iran shares a border – Lebanon (that tiny dot of blue on the Mediterranean above) is a full two large countries (Iraq and Syria) away. But Iran has been profoundly dependent on Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon – murdering local opponents to Syrian policies in Lebanon and fomenting Iran’s support of Hezbollah – in transporting money and military aid to that terrorist organization. Even as allied sanctions have decimated Iran’s economy, sending massive financial support to Lebanon in exchange for political fealty has been Tehran’s unwavering commitment. The non-Shiite parties, still uncomfortable with Hezbollah’s power in the country, have tolerated Iran’s presence in the country because of the massive economic aid that they have received.

Iran has funneled huge sums of cash through Hezbollah into Lebanon to gain friends by rebuilding what Israeli bombs have destroyed, adding infrastructure, hospitals and humanitarian aid to win friends and influence people. Tehran is now promising to solve Lebanon’s electricity shortage with a new hydro-electric project. But with Syria teetering and that quasi-Shiite minority government seemingly vulnerable to collapse, Iran has redoubled its efforts to maintain its hold on Lebanon: “Iran’s eagerness to shower money on Lebanon when its own finances are being squeezed by sanctions is the latest indication of just how worried Tehran is at the prospect that Syria’s leader, Bashar al-Assad, could fall. Iran relies on Syria as its bridge to the Arab world, and as a crucial strategic partner in confronting Israel. But the Arab revolts have shaken Tehran’s calculations, with Mr. Assad unable to vanquish an uprising that is in its 15th month.

“Iran’s ardent courtship of the Lebanese government indicates that Tehran is scrambling to find a replacement for its closest Arab ally, politicians, diplomats and analysts say. It is not only financing public projects, but also seeking to forge closer ties through cultural, military and economic agreements.” New York Times, May 24^th. Yet Iran’s control is threatened by political change in Syria, and Lebanese locals are indeed concerned with what Iran is going to assure its influence.

“The Lebanese have largely accepted that Iran serves as Hezbollah’s main patron for everything from missiles to dairy cows. But branching out beyond the Shiites of Hezbollah is another matter… ‘They are trying to reinforce their base in Lebanon to face any eventual collapse of the regime in Syria,’ said Marwan Hamade, a Druse leader and Parliament member, noting that a collapse would sever the ‘umbilical cord’ through which Iran supplied Hezbollah and gained largely unfettered access to Lebanon for decades… ‘Hezbollah has developed into being a beachhead of Iranian influence not only in Lebanon, but on the Mediterranean — trying to spread Iranian culture, Iranian political domination and now an Iranian economic presence,’ Mr. Hamade said. ‘But there is a kind of Lebanese rejection of too much Iranian involvement here.’” NY Times.

The big threat to Lebanese politics has always been the Syrian presence, often military or Syrian secret police operating in Lebanon to enforce their view of the world, one not-so-coincidentally shared and financed by Iran. With the exception of the Shiites and their Hezbollah, there has always been Lebanese resentment and fear of this large Syrian threat (which has often escalated to direct intervention by force) on their border. But with such overwhelming Syrian military superiority, the Lebanese have been force to accept their harsh subservient reality... until now, as Syria’s military and political focus has moved from dominating Lebanon to its own internal survival. Yet conflicts, so far confined to the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, between local Alawites (the highest reaches of Syria’s power elite are members of the Shiite-affiliated religious sect) sympathetic to the Assad regime and Lebanese Sunnis who are solidity behind their disenfranchised Syrian brethren, the majority in Syria, have claimed almost a dozen and a half lives in recent weeks.

“Therein lies the rub. Syria, run by a nominally Shiite Muslim sect [Alawites], fostered its alliance with Iran as a counterweight to Sunni Muslim powers like Saudi Arabia. The alliance was built more on confronting the West and its allies than on any sectarian sympathies… In Lebanon, a nation of various religious sects, many interpret Iran’s reference to ‘Muslim’ as solely ‘Shiite Muslim.’ Hezbollah insists that that is not the case and that the money comes with no strings attached and is for the good for all Lebanese.” NY Times. Iran pushed Sunni PM Mikati to the top of Hezbollah to make that point, but most Lebanese are skeptical. Will Syria’s Assad government fall? Can Iran maintain its power in Lebanon if that happens? What is Lebanon’s future in a world with a dismembered Syria? It is a fascinating turn of events, and hopefully the United States will simply let the politics unfold, since anything that America supports is likely to find instantaneous local rejection.

I’m Peter Dekom, and as the son of a U.S. diplomat living in Lebanon in my teenage years, I witnessed first-hand the massive Lebanese distrust of Syria and her cronies.