Where our attack on Iraq has yet to find any justification in why we did it (there just weren’t any weapons of mass destruction) or how it benefited us (we literally handed over control of the country to the clearly-pro-Iranian majority), our attack on Afghanistan was a direct response to the Taliban’s rather open and direct support of the al Qaeda attackers who fomented the 9/11 decimation of the Twin Towers and the crash into the Pentagon. We toppled the regime, invaded… and then withdrew critical forces to Iraq to fight “the other war.” The Taliban had time on their side and used it well.
Not only did we pull troops out to fight in Iraq long before there was the slightest semblance of stability in this rugged and desolate nation, not only had we armed and trained the mountain guerilla fighters who now opposed us when we funded the Mujahedeen in their war against the Soviets but we imposed a government that redefined cronyism and corruption to levels that even that nation had never seen before. The Karzai regime, hated by almost all, never controlled much more than the area around the capital city of Kabul… war lords and Taliban controlled the rest, letting go when NATO forces attacked, returning when they left (as they always did).
The Taliban smiled as the U.S. economy groaned and sank. They knew whether it was next year, next decade or whenever, NATO forces would leave. And when they did, since they already controlled most of the countryside, taking over completely would be very, very easy. Watch. The people figured out pretty quickly that there was zero percentage in backing Karzai or the NATO forces. Not only were these American allies failing to spread the Kabul government into the rest of the country, but they were actually having little or no impact on the reduction of Taliban control. It paid to cooperate with the Taliban.
As time passed, the Taliban grew bolder. With “insiders” working at every strategic military installation as members of the Afghan military, they infiltrated cadres of police officers and local governmental operations, punishing fiercely anyone who really was working against them. Taliban spies and saboteurs were everywhere. And the locals knew that they pretty much better tow the Taliban party line, since they clearly were the successors on the rise. No longer content with withdrawal and return when allied forces targeted a given region, the Taliban became strong enough to attack the strongest bases inflicting death and destruction at level paralleling a mainstream military attack. Their “green on blue” plants – soldiers and police trainees who were being trained by NATO forces to replace them when NATO forces departed as scheduled in 2014 – turned on their NATO compadres with increasing frequency, shooting and blowing them up when their backs were turned. They pointed out weakness and created new plans of attack.
After a September 14th attack on NATO Camp Bastion/Camp Leatherneck (see map above), the main base in the country for U.S. Marines and U.K. forces, that killed 2 Marines and destroyed six Harrier jet aircraft, as explosive attacks and violent protests followed the YouTube airing of an anti-Muslim film all across the land, NATO had had enough: “After years of tightly intertwining its forces with Afghan troops, the American-led military coalition has sharply curtailed ground-level operations with the Afghan Army and police forces, potentially undercutting the training mission that is the heart of the Western exit strategy… The new limits, which were issued [September 16th] and require a general’s approval for any joint work at the small-unit level, were prompted by a spike in attacks on international troops by Afghan soldiers and police over the past six weeks. There was also fear that anger over an anti-Islam video could prompt more of what the coalition calls insider attacks, American officials said…
“Coalition officials stressed that their officers would still be paired with higher-level Afghan units, and that the basic concept of training, advising and fighting alongside Afghan units in the field to ready them to fight on their own remained at the core of war strategy… Coalition officers said the order to curtail direct cooperation covers all work done with Afghan forces below the level of a battalion. An American battalion has about 700 to 800 troops, though some are larger or smaller, and is designed to be the smallest unit that can fight independent of a higher command. .. But in Afghanistan, where the Taliban blend easily and often strike in small groups, most of the combat goes on far below the battalion level, with small squads of about 10 men or platoons of about 15 to 40 soldiers or Marines.” New York Times, September 18th.
We lost the war in Iraq. With every car bomb blast in Baghdad, with every sign of the growing alliance between Iraq and Iran, surely we lost any possible benefits for America in that dreaded war. We strengthened our enemy Iran, infuriated so many in the Middle East who believed we were waging a war against their religion, fanned the recruiting flames of militant Islam, decimated our own nation with crippling deficits needs to fight these prolong struggles and lost thousands of soldiers in the process. Now, in giving up our training mission in Afghanistan, no matter the lip service about training the leadership (they don’t fight the relevant battles) even though we aren’t training the implementing forces, there isn’t the slightest justification for our remaining in Afghanistan. None.
We need to rethink why we have an incessant need to invade nations that attack us. In recent years we not have fared well in distant lands with different cultures and religions where we will always be viewed as foreign invaders. I agree that a military response is usually the correct response when some nation or group attacks America or its forces around the world.
What would have happened if all we did was use our massive fire power to wreak havoc across the Taliban-controlled universe back in 2001? The message would have been beyond clear. Invasion was not necessary in that circumstance, but it was consistent with our pattern of conduct.
We don’t need to deploy U.S. forces within offending nations; we are not responsible to rebuild the damage we inflict on them for supporting unprovoked attacks against us. Of course, there are appropriate places for boots on the ground, but our leadership seems addicted to that course of action notwithstanding decades of devastating “unintended consequences.”
I’m Peter Dekom, and I am reminded of one definition of insanity: “repeating the same behavior and expecting a different result.”
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