Stalemates and Tipping Points

As Turkish artillery fire responds in kind to a Syrian mortar attack on a Turkish border village, as massive explosions and car bombs take their toll in big cities with big government targets, the world outside expects a rapid end to hostilities as the Assad regime crumbles under the incessant battles, withering rear-guard attacks, continued defections, economic paralysis and diminishing resources. But upon closer examination, the war(s) in Syria are anything but clearly tilting in favor of one side or the other. Despite virtual global condemnation, support from Iran and Russia has sustained the brutal dictator, and a change in tactics may have reduced the continuing threat from one area where rebels need “more.” Defections from trained soldiers.

To win wars, you need competent soldiers and military hardware. With the United Nations sitting on the sidelines, de-powered by continuing Security Council vetoes from Russia and China, the rebels have pretty much been left to fend for themselves. They have relied heavily on massive defections from government troops, who brought their skills and weapons with them. Sensitive to this process, the Syrian leadership has changed its strategy, putting fewer of its soldiers in direct contact with civilians likely to have rebel sympathies, choosing instead to use its long-range artillery and air superiority to cleanse offending towns and neighborhoods. This reduces the contacts from house-to-house fighting, neighborhood invasions, where soldiers have to confront innocent civilians and their once-fellow soldiers who have already changed sides begging their comrades to defect.

Indiscriminate car bombings, favored by extremists in the rebel ranks, also alienate civilians who inevitably get caught in the fray. For an increasing segment of Syria, they just want it all to go away… they just want to be left alone to live their lives without fear and with the normal government services and infrastructure intact and in service. Syrian leaders have also moved their most loyal troops to the checkpoints to reduce the possibility of getting messages back and forth to potential defectors or “spies” still in government ranks. Defectors also have to deal with the ramifications of their families who remain behind, well within Syrian-government-controlled boundaries.

“[N]ow opposition commanders say defections have slowed to a trickle. Some commanders have given up trying to entice defectors, and others have resorted to more desperate measures: cajoling, duping, threatening and even drugging and kidnapping military men to get them to change sides, or at least stay out of the fight. Without defections, they say, the opposition cannot hope to grow, never mind prevail… ‘We use means only used by the devil,’ said Ahmed Qunatri, a rebel commander in northern Syria who defected from the Republican Guard…

“Some rebel commanders now fret that all the soldiers who were inclined to defect already have. The rest remain loyal to the government, or are terrified of betraying it. Others are just suspicious of an armed movement that has found extremists among its ranks. A suicide attack in Aleppo on [October 3^rd] that killed more than 40 people and devastated a government-held district drew widespread anger. Aware of just how much the violence is undermining popular support for the uprising, some rebel groups immediately tried to blame the government for staging the bombing. The government blamed the rebels. By nightfall, Jabhet al-Nusra, an insurgent group affiliated with Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the suicide bombings.” New York Times, October 3^rd.

If this trend continues, and if the outside world sits idly by hoping for change, several possibilities loom with ugly potential. First, this just becomes a long-standing civil war without any near-term solutions. Second, as the less-than-cohesive rebel factions begin to disagree on tactics and the end-game (so far, they have been willing to accept deals with the devil just to get Assad out), they may just turn on each other.

Popular sentiments, voiced by people just plain tired of war, may increasingly accept the continued reign of the brutal Assad government just to allow their lives to regain some semblance of stability and normalcy. In case you wondered why Assad doesn’t just step down and go live in some swanky palace in a friendly nation. We need to question exactly whose side time favors as the war rages on. And if indeed Assad remains in power – or at least his Alawite elite – how exactly does the rest of the world treat this rogue nation that has slaughtered so many of its own people? And if the world doesn’t like that possibility, then exactly what has to happen, and who has to do it?! And when?

I’m Peter Dekom, and happy endings are often relegated to mythology and fairy tales.