The above two photographs, one representing the continuous “appeasement” of Adolph Hitler’s annexation of neighboring territory in the 1930s – U.K. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s shameful shaking Hitler’s hand, accepting the latter’s pledge of no further territorial ambitions – and the other, representing a lesson that the United States learned years later, was the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, just before the collapse of the entire USSR in 1991 – are the subtexts that West and East should never forget.
Should Vladimir Putin avoid a diplomatic path to stop his incursion and continue with his purported effort to occupy all of Ukraine, positioning a puppet government in Kyiv, he faces a seething hatred of Russia, which could inspire an active underground Ukrainian insurgency, that might dog Russian occupation for its entire existence. Already meeting more armed resistance that he expected, Putin is acutely aware of history.
If nothing else, even as Ukraine probably succumbs to a massive Russian invasion force if that continues, NATO allies would probably find a way to keep those underground Ukrainian insurgents supplied with weapons, much the way the CIA armed jihadist Mujahedeen fighters to take down Soviet fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s. A new Cold War with shooting surrogates looms. The Soviet Union finally but reluctantly admitted its total military casualty figures during that Afghan conflict: 13,310 soldiers had been killed, 35,478 wounded and 311 were missing. They do remember history in Russia.
The slow and unrelenting asymmetrical attacks of loyal Ukrainian guerilla fighters, probable during any Russian occupation, combined with the longer-term withering impacts of “slow-to-have-an-impact” sanctions, may well spell the end of Vladimir Putin’s repressive reign. And he knows that. Although Putin seems stubbornly hell-bent on taking Ukraine… all of Ukraine… he also knows that he is now particularly well-positioned to neutralize Kyiv without incurring too many casualties, also giving the West pause on its sanctions.
As Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the world on television, he expressed his disappointment at NATO’s unwillingness to go further in its sanctions and assistance to his country against the Russian invasion. He also begged Putin to cease fire and come to the bargaining table. A crack in the diplomatic door opened. As reported in the February 25th New York Times, following Zelensky’s call for all male able-bodied Ukrainians to take up arms against the Russians, there was a small ray of hope for a negotiated end to hostilities: “Russian officials signaled an openness to talks, but President Vladimir V. Putin derided the Ukrainian government and it was unclear under what conditions the Kremlin would consider negotiations.” Could this be viable? Would it hold against a Russian government that abrogated its commitment – expressed in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 which it signed – to respect Ukraine’s borders?
The West should never forget how it once dealt with another tyrant with territorial expansion on his mind: Pre-World War II Adolph Hitler. Then, the powerful anti-war constituency in Europe, led by the UK, granted Hitler free reign over specified territories with large populations of ethnic Germans. Western nations – the United States was not in the mix at the time – repeatedly ignored treaty violations and territorial annexations… until Hitler invaded Poland by force in 1939, and WWII began. Here’s a short history of those appeasement efforts to avoid war… that failed.
“In March 1936, a cautious Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland, forbidden under Versailles [the German surrender after WWI]. The feared Anglo-French reaction never came. In the League's council, the USSR was the only country to propose sanctions. British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin ruled out the possibility.
“Germany and Italy now realised that the democracies were seeking to avoid confrontation, so both countries continued to 'test the limits'. During the Spanish Civil War, Hitler and Mussolini contravened the 'Non-Intervention Agreement', sending troops, equipment and planes to back the rebels. Their intervention was ignored by the international community. When [Neville] Chamberlain became [UK] Prime Minister in May 1937, the pattern of appeasement had already been set. In March 1938, Hitler's Anschluss (union) with Austria was once again met with Anglo-French impotence and inaction.
“Czechoslovakia had been created under Versailles, and included a large German minority mostly living in the Sudetenland on the border with Germany. In mid-September 1938, Hitler encouraged the leader of the Sudeten Nazis to rebel, demanding union with Germany. When the Czech government declared martial law, Hitler threatened war.
“On 15 September, Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Without consulting the Czech authorities, he pledged to give Germany all the areas with a German population of more than 50 per cent. France was persuaded to agree. Hitler then altered his criteria, demanding all the Sudetenland. At the Munich Conference on 30 September, Britain and France agreed to his demands. Chamberlain was confident that he had secured 'peace for our time'.” History.co.uk
There are so many variables at stake in Ukraine. From “trusting” Russia – which is inherently untrustworthy – to contemplate military escalation and additional isolation of Russia from the major global markets… which can work only for a relatively short period. The most recent arguments have particularly focused on the privately-created inter-bank (11,000 banks) messaging/currency transfer system that operates in nearly 200 hundred nations – SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) – which is not controlled by any central governmental power.
To cut this off, nations in Europe would instantly lose their ability to buy desperately needed natural gas from Russia… with no near-term hope of replacing that flow. Likewise, Russia would be seriously hampered in effecting overseas purchases, forcing it to rely and further develop its own alternative SWIFT-equivalent system with strong support from China. Russia would be further incented to go its own way without concern for participating in a Western-dominated financial network. A short-term solution could produce long-term blowback.
In the end, stopping violence, saving lives and restoring global stability are in our collective headlights. And there is absolutely no harm in supporting a ceasefire pending diplomatic exchanges, but…
I’m Peter Dekom, and those who do not study history are condemned to repeat its mistakes.
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