With the Pakistani Supreme Court reversing a statute aimed at protecting certain incumbents from anti-corruption prosecutions, President Asif Zardari finds himself in the cross-hairs of an investigation that threatens to push him out of office. Strangely, the Pakistani body politic is pleased with this result, not just because they so wanted a corrupt politician to fall (Pakistanis pretty much assume they are all corrupt), but because Zardari was cozying up to the U.S. government and supporting their anti-Taliban policies, including the controversial NATO “drone” attacks in the Tribal District across the Afghan border.
Indeed, anti-American hardliner, Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, seems very much in line to gain with Zardari’s demise. And if this happens, a likely path, the United States may find itself without even token support from Pakistan in America’s and NATO’s attempt to limit the ability of al Qaeda and Taliban operatives to use the Pakistani border regions as safe havens against U.S. attacks. Scary stuff, as this increasingly anti-American nation holds a stockpile of more than 60-70 nuclear warheads, which would be devastating in the hands of Islamist militants.
Most Pakistanis hate their country’s official affiliation with America’s anti-terrorism strategy (they still cling to that “war on terror” phrase even though the Obama administration has tried to distance itself from that descriptive epithet), and feel somewhat betrayed that their government is willing to support an aggressive “infidel” nation – one that breaks promises and pushes nations around solely for its own agenda in Pakistani eyes – against a fellow Muslim group of perceived “freedom fighters.”
In their eyes, notwithstanding the occasional internal attack of a Taliban militant group against the Pakistani government, the Taliban is not their real enemy… India, which holds mostly-Muslim Kashmir (a northern Indian state that borders Pakistan) against Pakistani claims, is the only real foe. Bottom line: to the ordinary Pakistani, they have no sympathy or support for the U.S. position against even the most obvious and threatening Islamist militants; that is America’s problem and should not involve Pakistan at all. In fact, they really hope we fail in Afghanistan, which appears to be another “inevitable” in the struggles in Central Asia.
On January 2nd, a suicide bomber detonated 550 pounds of high explosives at a crowded volleyball tournament in the Pakistani village of Shah Hasan Khel in Northwest Pakistan. The blast claimed the lives of at least 96 innocents, raising the total killed in recent bomb attacks in Pakistan to around 600 since October. Three dozen homes were leveled. The consensus was that this attack was in retaliation for the village’s apparent cooperation with forces that tried to resist the infiltration of such villages by Taliban militants.
The January 2nd Washington Post: “The village lies in Lakki Marwat district near South Waziristan, a semiautonomous tribal region where the army has battled the Pakistani Taliban since October. The military operation was undertaken with the backing of the U.S., which is eager for Pakistan to free its tribal belt of militants believed to be involved in attacks on Western troops in Afghanistan… But the offensive has provoked apparent reprisal attacks across the country. Those behind the strikes appear increasingly willing to hit targets beyond security forces. No group claimed responsibility for Friday's blast, but that is not uncommon when many civilians die.”
An under-staffed an ill-equipped local police force is no match for the powerful Taliban, who will target any local leader who gets in their way: “Several suicide attacks have targeted meetings of anti-Taliban elders, and militants also often go after individuals. One reason militancy has spread in Pakistan's semiautonomous tribal belt is because insurgents have slain dozens of tribal elders and filled a power vacuum.” The Post. The Taliban’s ace in the hole is their claim that they are simply resisting a hostile, U.S.-backed and corrupt Pakistani government effort to defeat Islam, a position that strikes a sympathetic chord even as Taliban militants blow up hundreds of innocents along the way.
Strange as it may seem, such attacks do not spur Pakistanis into a cry for revenge against the Taliban, even if they don’t like the extremism or the violent toll directly linked to this Islamist group; instead, they want their government to distance itself from anti-Taliban American policies, thereby reducing the need for the Taliban to mount such devastating attacks. And as long as al Qaeda and anti-NATO Taliban operatives can find safe haven in Pakistan, our war in Afghanistan is an effort that cannot end. When the going gets tough, the Taliban tough can slide into Pakistan and wait until our forces recede… springing back when the coast is clear… mounting lightening attacks against U.S. positions and friendly villages, and then returning to safe haven within Pakistan. To make matters worse in these Islamic tribal regions and further reinforcing these cultural complexities and local sympathies, “tribal codes require the protection of those who seek refuge and help.” Jan 2nd New York Times.
If Zardari is thrown from office, American policy-makers will be hard-pressed to find a replacement that is remotely sympathetic to our cause. Unless America can take and hold Pakistan – an alternative that is not on anybody’s table – we are not in a position to win a sustained victory against the Taliban/al Qaeda forces in the region. Obama’s aim appears to be to generate sufficient military success to bring the Taliban to the bargaining table – his apparent Afghan exit strategy – but local sensibilities and anti-American feelings only seem to be strengthening the Taliban’s hand in the region.
I’m Peter Dekom, and I don’t think we should fight wars we cannot win.
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