When the Americans Withdraw

I have often blogged that Pakistan is one of the most dangerous nations on earth. Politically unstable and ripped apart in an almost feudalistic class war, this seeming democracy has never fulfilled the role of “American ally” in regional peace as the U.S. has claimed. Not only have even the most pro-American factions made unholy “we’ll look the other way while you run militant Islamic madrassa schools and recruit heavily on our college campuses” agreements with the most threatening Islamic fundamentalists, but the military and the intelligence services have always leaned heavily against U.S. anti-terrorism policies in the area. The general consensus of the people – who almost in lockstep continue to see India, followed by Israel and the United States as enemies – is profoundly anti-American.

The military is one of the few ways for impoverished and disenfranchised Pakistanis – the demographic segment where fundamentalist Islam has planted its deepest roots – to move upward into positions of influence and power. And it precisely the military – in control of at least 70 nuclear warheads with the means of delivering them – that is at the core of anti-American policies in the region. The June 24^th New York Times: “Washington has watched with some nervousness as [the head of Pakistan’s Army] General [Ashfaq Parvez] Kayani and Pakistan’s spy chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, shuttle between Islamabad and Kabul, telling [Afghan President] Mr. [hamid] Karzai that they agree with his assessment that the United States cannot win in Afghanistan, and that a postwar Afghanistan should incorporate the Haqqani network, a longtime Pakistani asset.” Karzai and Kayani are pictured above.

There’s a tiny little problem with that “Haqqani network”; it is run by “Sirajuddin Haqqani, an ally of Al Qaeda who runs a major part of the insurgency in Afghanistan.” The Times. And what Pakistan is pushing for is a power-sharing alliance between Haqqani and Karzai that would also involve brokering a deal with the Afghan Taliban and one or two of the other factions in the region. If the entire American mission statement for its recent wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been to deny al Qaeda a platform to gather strength and expand its global power base, this result could be catastrophic. Unfortunately, that the Americans cannot even control the few Afghan Taliban strongholds they have been able to capture – like Marja – has led to a general regional feeling the Americans will fare no better in Afghanistan than did the Soviets in their the ill-fated, decade long attempt by in the 1980s. If anything, Taliban forces have never been stronger in Afghanistan than they are today.

For the Americans and their NATO allies to prevail, the military commitment must be elevated well above the 100,000 troops currently involved (some believe that it would require a multiple of that number), willing to remain for decades with the blind hope that some form of economic prosperity (perhaps mining versus opium) will stabilize the region and unify tribes who have fought each other since history recorded their efforts into a functioning nation. We have neither the will nor the financial wherewithal to generate this result. Welcome to the lose-lose. With Karzai having an alternative to his American support system, his corrupt government will be even more difficult to control. Since he “knows” the American cause is long gone, his survival instincts will push him farther into the Pakistani-al Qaeda-leaning nest.< /o:p>

The stage is clearly being set for the Pakistan plan: “Pakistan has already won what it sees as an important concession in Kabul, the resignations this month of the [Afghani] intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, and the interior minister, Hanif Atmar. The two officials, favored by Washington, were viewed by Pakistan as major obstacles to its vision of hard-core Taliban fighters’ being part of an Afghanistan settlement, though the circumstances of their resignations did not suggest any connection to Pakistan.” The Times. Is Haqqani willing to sell out his long-time al Qaeda allies – maybe even handing over Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahri to the Americans – to garner U.S. support? Is this remotely possible? Or is this a game that might look good on paper but literally will have a longer term effect that is quite the opposite? Does bringing al Qaeda out into the open in a new nation give the U.S. a more clearly-defined geographical target? Welcome to Afghanistan, General David Petraeus. All yours.

I’m Peter Dekom, and wars built on rage without the willingness to do what it takes over a very long run have become an unfortunate American tradition.