3,500 People Later

As 19 of the 21 nations comprising the Arab League voted on November 27^th to apply economic sanctions against Syria and the Bashar a-Assad regime, two countries abstained: Iraq and Lebanon. Iran is not a member of the League, and this latest turn of events is viewed as a blow to Iran’s attempt to straddle the center of the Muslim world, and embrace nations that have traditionally been bastions of that vast majority of Muslims (85%) – usually strongly anti-Shiite Sunnis – and consolidate regional power around itself. Iran is the center of the minority Shiite faith (15% of the Islamic world). Lebanon, whose politics is dominated by the Shiite Hezbollah and where politicians who oppose Syria have been assassinated, and Iraq, which is now a majority Shiite state with strong connections to Iran, just fell into their roles as local affiliates with allegiance to Syria and Iran.

How such sanctions would work when Syria’s two most likely border states, through which goods pass, were opposed is at best dicey: “Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said [November 26^th] that Iraq has ‘reservations’ about sanctions and analysts doubt Iraq would implement them. And Lebanon, whose government is dominated by groups that support Assad, including the militant political group Hezbollah, also is unlikely to enforce the sanctions.” Washington Post, November 28^th.

Syria’s brutal repression of its people, using the military to crush dissent with increasing violent (killing as estimated 3,500 to date), has been universally condemned by most of the rest of the world. But who is President Bashar Assad and how does he manage to force his military, comprised of common folk like those they are killing, to purge these protest movement with such virulence? To understand Bashar, one must go back to see where he came from. The above picture was taken sometime in 1994 (Bashar is second from the left in the back row), before Bassel Assad (middle back row) was killed.

Reflecting that same kind of ascension of military officers taking control of their countries, Syria’s dictatorial force, Hafez al-Assad, worked his way through the military and seized power in 1970 through a coup referred to as the “Corrective Revolution.” His elder son and heir apparent, Bassel, was groomed in the military, and rose to Syria’s chief of security until his death in 1994 (he liked fast cars and was killed flooring his prized Mercedes). Up to that point, Bashar had virtually no interest in politics, choosing to become a medical doctor with a specialty in ophthalmology. With Bassel gone, Hafez determined that Bashar would have to take over, so he was rapidly moved into the Syrian military to prepare for his eventual installment as Hafez’ successor.

The al-Assad family is associated with a very small branch of Islam, a mystical sect known as the Alawis with an affiliation to the Shiite view of Islam. Many old-world Alawis have migrated into mainstream Shiite beliefs, but there is still an ethnic allegiance among the scions of this sect. What’s more important is their disproportional power in this Middle Eastern nation. “Although the Alawis comprise the entirety of the top military and intelligence offices, government employees from lower bureaucratic ranks are largely from the majority Sunni Muslim faith, who represent about 74% of Syria's population. Today the Alawis exist as a minority, but are the most politically powerful sect in Syria and the only one with direct government control.” Wikipedia.

Just like Saddam Hussein, a minority Sunni where the vast majority of his subjects were Shiites, the reverse power dynamic – minority Shiite-affiliates dominating a Sunni nation – exists in Syria. So to be in power as an Alawis, a leader has to know that any anti-government movements in that vast majority of Sunnis, a sect known to be openly hostile to the Shiite interpretation of the Qu’ran, must be extinguished quickly and firmly for fear of a majority turning on the unpopular religious beliefs of their top leadership.

A recent article in Foreign Policy Magazine explains exactly how inseparable the military is from its top “civilian” leadership: “During its decades of rule, moreover, the Assad family developed a strong political safety net by firmly integrating the military into the regime. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, seized power after rising through the ranks of the Syrian armed forces, during which time he established a network of loyal Alawites by installing them in key posts. In fact, the military, ruling elite, and ruthless secret police are so intertwined that it is now impossible to separate the Assad regime from the security establishment. Bashar al-Assad’s threat to use force against protesters would be more plausible than Tunisia’s or Egypt’s were. So, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, where a professionally trained military tended to play an independent role, the regime and its loyal forces have been able to deter all but the most resolute and fearless oppositional activists. In this respect, the situation in Syria is to a certain degree comparable to Saddam Hussein’s strong Sunni minority rule in Iraq.”

When Hafez died in 2000, Bashar became President (confirmed in a referendum where he ran unopposed). While there were expectations of reform when a medical doctor assumed the country’s reigns, there were token and superficial efforts, mostly making it easier for foreign investors. The trickle of oil that Syria produces will turn it into a net oil importer by 2015, and its population growth and concomitant poverty have been explosive. Indeed, Bashar seemed to adhere to his family’s strict method of repressive rule that allowed a minority to rule a disenfranchised majority. Vowing to continue to fight “terrorism” and decrying the dissolution of “Arab unity” as a betrayal, Assad stood in defiance of the Arab League’s vote. The message echoed throughout his administration: “Outraged at the Arab League’s unprecedented battery of sanctions on Syria, the country’s foreign minister denounced the steps [November 28^th] as ‘economic war’ by brethren states, and he hinted at retaliation.” New York Times, November 28^th.

With porous borders, east and west, it is unclear how the sanctions would work: “Halting dealings with the central bank will make international trade more difficult, said Chris Phillips of the Economist Intelligence Unit, as will the ban against commercial flights between Syria and Arab countries, which could impact on the business community that has benefited from Assad’s liberalization measures and has thus far remained largely supportive of the government.” Washington Post. The likely ineffectiveness of the sanctions may produce some concessions from the Assad regime, but a near-term ouster seems unlikely. The battle for the hearts and minds of the Syrian people may eventually crack this hardened wall, but the Assad/military cabal is unlikely to go down easily, and the Syrian military is witnessing how difficult it is for the Egyptian military to maintain its domination of Egypt once the civilian “democracy” cat is let out of the bag.

I’m Peter Dekom, trying to look behind the headlines and simply explain “why.”