Islamist Democracy?

This is a long blog, but its message runs deep into the expectations Americans have when a government is democratically elected. A “fellow democracy,” however, is hardly an automatically trusted ally. Is the above question an oxymoron? Can a government that openly espouses Islamic law – Sharia – equally embrace democracy? Does it matter if the government is anchored in Sunni or Shiite beliefs? And does an Islamist democracy drag itself closer to Western democracies, Muslim-based governments or somewhere in the middle? The aftermath of the Arab Spring has moved these questions to the forefront of global politics. As a moderate Islamist-leaning government is democratically elected in Tunisia following a regime change… and as Libyan political voices are sounding equally strongly towards this new moderate Islamism… these are significant questions to ask.

The question of Sunni vs. Shiite is actually more significant that simply a difference of religious interpretation. Under ancient Sunni political structures, most usually associated with the Caliphate that ruled over vast stretches of lands in Asia, Africa and even Europe after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7^th century, the government is the “protector” of Islam, but not its spiritual leader or interpreter. Thus, under Sunni systems, there is a separation of sorts between church and state. Even in ultra-conservative Saudi Arabia, it is the Imam (also Umam) – the senior body of religious leaders – who lead the faith, and the royal family that leads the country (yet still protects the faith). The Qur’an is a holy book that is to be read by everybody… and read literally.

The Shiite construction of Islam – most notably represented by the Iranian theocracy where church and state are one – holds that the Qur’an is a mystical book capable of interpretation only by the highest religious leader (in ancient time, the Imam), and that all laws and instructions for life must come through this prelate from Allah himself. Thus, the state may have elected officials, but they are subject to the control of the clerical hierarchy above them, regardless of democratic intent.

Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are primarily and significantly Sunni, so the notion of a separation of church (mosque?) and state is more natural, even if Sharia forms the basis of the legal system. Egypt seems to be struggling with the notion of any democracy, as the military presses to maintain their hold on the government, having appointed every president since Nasser to the top spot. The military is likely to create a semblance of democracy without really altering their grip on government.

Libya’s voices – regional and often tribal – have found only one seriously unifying voice that seems to be heard over the screams of more modern secular leaders: Islamic leaders promising a system of government under the Sunni vision of government. The only country to have had democratic elections following an Arab Spring regime change is Tunisia, so it is instructive to view the results of the October 24^th vote: “Tunisia’s moderate Islamist political party emerged … as the acknowledged leader in elections for a constitutional assembly and began talks to form a unity government with a coalition of liberals in a rare alliance that party leaders hailed as an inclusive model for countries emerging from the tumult of the Arab Spring.” New York Times, October 24^th. While the victors have touted accepting diversity and the enhanced role of women in a modern society, their frequent references to the dictates of the Qur’an and reliance on traditional Islamic principles have many secular skeptics worried.

The rhetoric is surprisingly conservative for a nascent democracy that seemed to embrace women as equals: “In announcing the success of the Libyan revolution and calling for a new, more pious nation, the head of the interim government, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, also seemed to clear the way for unrestricted polygamy in a Muslim country where it has been limited and rare for decades… In his speech, Mr. Abdel-Jalil declared that a Qaddafi-era law that placed restrictions on multiple marriages, which is a tenet of Islamic law, or Shariah, would be done away with. The law, which stated that a first wife had to give permission before others were added, for instance, had kept polygamy rare here.

‘This law is contrary to Shariah and must be stopped,’ Mr. Abdel-Jalil told the crowd, vowing that the new government would adhere more faithfully to Shariah. The next day he reiterated the point to reporters at a news conference: ‘Shariah allows polygamy,’ he said. Mr. Abdel-Jalil is known for his piety.” New York Times, October 29^th.

Nevertheless, the opposition has accepted a working relationship with the new religiously-leaning government: “By [the afternoon of the 24^th], Tunisian liberal parties said they were entering discussions to form a government led by their Islamist rival, Ennahda, after it swept to a plurality of about 40 percent in preliminary vote tallies. The acceptance of the results by rivals signaled the beginning of a partnership seldom seen in the Arab world, where Islamists’ few opportunities for victories at the voting booth have sometimes led to harsh crackdown or civil war.

“In neighboring Algeria, an electoral victory by Islamists 20 years ago set off a military coup and a decade of bloodshed, and in the Palestinian territories, the sweep to victory of Hamas in 2006 elections led to a showdown with the West, a split in the government and armed conflict in Gaza.” NY Times, Oct. 24^th. Can an Islamist party maintain a moderate stance? Can it effect reasonable and sustainable diplomatic ties to the West, particularly the United States? And will such a government continue in power without the threat of violent opposition or civil war? Only time will tell, but this is an experiment that remains an important and potentially game-changing force for hundreds of millions of people in the near term.

Even in established democracies, powerful “otherworld” elites – smacking more of criminal networks that industrial kingpins – have amassed such power and generated such incredible ties to the ruling class that unseating them is hardly possible. Take the dreaded Haqqani-Taliban who are waging well-planned, well-equipped attacks against American military forces in Afghanistan… and who are as safe and protected in democratic Pakistan as any group imaginable. “So close are the Haqqanis’ ties to Pakistan’s military and intelligence service that one might just as well look for them around the capital, Islamabad, or in the closely guarded military quarters of Rawalpindi… The Haqqani family, which runs the network like a mafia, maintains several town houses, including in Islamabad and elsewhere, and they have been known to visit military facilities in Rawalpindi, attend tribal gatherings and even travel abroad on pilgrimages, say military and political analysts who follow militant activity in Pakistan.” New York Times, October 31^st.

But the Haqqanis are necessary to Pakistan’s own strategy in the region, a need that totally trumps any American priority: “Pakistan’s biggest nightmare is a strong, centralized, nationalist Afghan state — just the kind the Americans have been striving to create. Such an Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders fear, will lay claim to the Pashtun areas that straddle a border that was drawn carelessly by the British and that Afghanistan has never fully accepted. They also fear that the Pashtuns might someday want a nation of their own.

“So in the thinking of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment, the Haqqanis make sense. They are Pashtuns but not nationalists, and they are increasingly seen as being more reliable partners than even the Quetta Shura, the Afghan Taliban leadership council based in Pakistan. And they provide a hedge in Afghanistan against any encroachment by Pakistan’s chief rival, India.

“The Pakistani military has always distinguished between the “good Taliban” — meaning those who fight in Afghanistan, like the Haqqanis — and the “bad Taliban” — meaning members of the Pakistani Taliban who are at war with the Pakistani state. Among the Taliban this distinction does not exist, however, said two militant insiders, one a former militant and one a current fighter.” New York Times. Americans must learn that when you roam the globe and engage in military ventures, regardless of the motivation and notwithstanding the existence of regional democracies, we are always subject to regional politics, long-standing ethnic ties and local priorities that will always prevail over American wishes.

I’m Peter Dekom, and it is a mistake to assume that the triumph of democracy automatically moves a nation closer to the United States.