Monday, February 18, 2013
Humanitarianism, Blowback and Budgets
To say Syria is a mess is an understatement of alarming proportions. The regime cannot endure the slow sapping of its strength, its failure to command and control its people and its legacy of brutality that cannot be forgiven. The economy is in shambles, infrastructure is crumbling, its most basic functions, from ordinary criminal justice to the distribution of food and medicine, are ceasing to deliver the most rudimentary necessities.
Still, as Russia and China use their Security Council veto power to block U.N. intervention and Iran increasingly sees Syria as a vital ally in its battle against Israel and the West (Syria is run by a tiny minority fellow-Shiite government), the rebellion is virtually without the kind of outside support it needs to shorten the murderous conflict and replace the regime that caused it all. Thousands and thousands more are likely to perish in this prolonged conflict. The rebels have been reduced to opening the door for possible negotiations with the brutal regime they seek to destroy. They are seeing just how long the battle would take without outside help.
Those who can supply extrinsic support seem terrified and paralyzed into inaction. Memories of “blowback” from the Afghani Mujahedeen the United States covertly armed to help topple the Soviet military (and ultimately the USSR herself) who returned as al Qaeda operatives hell-bent on the attacks on 9/11/01, the usurpation of Western (particularly American) and Israeli power from the region… fester in the minds of politicians and military advisors alike. Visions of the Arab Spring blossoming into the Islamist power grab for control of nations that removed brutal dictators are fresh. Would we replace unfriendly governments with new opponents more willing to show their displeasure with the West via a force of arms?
Deficits that originated in waging unwinnable wars against implacable foes – generating trillions of dollars of waste and many thousands of deaths – have exploded to unsustainable levels, amplified by the failure to raise taxes when appropriating war budgets followed by a recession that pushed revenues down at every level. Thoughts of military efforts, begun with very different short-term intentions, that bogged down for more than a decade twist and turn in the minds of the deciders. Could Syria be another bottomless pit?
The French seem to be able to attack and withdraw as they are doing in Mali and as they did in Algeria, but the American track record is very different. Having never had Middle Eastern, Asian or African colonies and with the vast majority of American people lacking any understanding of the relevant and deep cultural differences in these regions, despite its vast military capabilities, the United States seems particularly ill-suited to exercise its military might to stop the horrors in these regions, even if teams with its traditional allies.
But Americans fundamentally rail at injustice and brutality. It is who we are, even if we discover occasional hypocrisy in our actions. We don’t like what the Assad regime is doing to its own people. We want to help the underdog. We don’t like reading about the deaths and suffering, and with all of our military capability, so many are asking why we can’t use those resources for a just cause.
The Obama administration seems almost torn apart internally by the debate. Although the general public seldom sees the factions that embrace different potential strategies in open discussion, recent testimony before the Senate illustrates the depth of the division of opinions.
On February 7th, outgoing Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator John McCain asked him point blank, “How many more have to die before you recommend military action?” The answer was startling. “Panetta acknowledged that he and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, had supported a plan last year to arm carefully vetted Syrian rebels. But it was ultimately vetoed by the White House, Mr. Panetta said, although it was developed by David H. Petraeus, the C.I.A. director at the time, and backed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, then the secretary of state…
“The plan that Mr. Petraeus developed, and that Mrs. Clinton supported, called for vetting rebels and training a cadre of fighters who would be supplied with weapons. The plan would have enlisted the help of a neighboring state… The proposal offered the potential reward of creating Syrian allies for the United States during the conflict and if President Bashar al-Assad is removed… Some administration officials expected the issue to be revisited after the election. But when Mr. Petraeus resigned because of an extramarital affair and Mrs. Clinton suffered a concussion, missing weeks of work, the issue was shelved.” New York Times, February 7th.
Undoubtedly, the risk of any action we might take in Syria is very real. “Jeffrey White, a former senior analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that providing weapons would help the rebels in their fight against a better-equipped government that has warplanes, armor and artillery, and reduce rebel casualties. .. Equally important, Mr. White said, it would give the United States influence with groups that would control Syria if Mr. Assad is ousted, and would diminish the influence of extremists.
“‘The day after the regime falls, the groups that have the guns will dominate the political and military situation,’ Mr. White said. ‘And if some of those groups owe that capability to us, that would be a good thing. It does not mean that we would control the situation, but it would give us a means of shaping it.’
“Taking a contrary view, Daniel C. Kurtzer, a former United States ambassador to Israel and Egypt, said the potential risks outweighed the gains. Even with thorough vetting, he said, it would be difficult to ensure that the weapons did not end up with unreliable or hostile groups. … ‘The problem that I think the White House has identified much more clearly than the national security team is, ‘Who are you going to deal with?'’ Mr. Kurtzer said.” NY Times. But if the Assad regime will inevitably fall, what is our risk of not acting at all? What are your thoughts?
I’m Peter Dekom, and tough problems generate tough choices.
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