The permutations of what can happen on the Korean Peninsula between Washington and Pyongyang are almost endless. From a surgical or even greater first strike by either nation against the other to an achievable accord… and everything in the middle. Until Donald Trump, the United States was globally viewed as the responsible adult in a relationship with a North Korean belligerent and rebellious teenager. Then came the cat-calls and tweets from a rather undignified American president. North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, must have felt somewhere between the victim of an insult to understanding that he just got under the skin of an American president like no other global leader anywhere. Kim could play Trump, even dance circles around him.
The rest of the world watched as each side pushed brinkmanship to a burning point that was rapidly becoming a genuine threat to world peace. Kim’s stature in the world skyrocketed as Trump’s global influence hit modern lows for any American president. With access to the bitcoin world, Kim’s personal access to global currency – through theft or graft – insured that his and his cronies’ personal lifestyle could sustain regardless of any level of economic sanctions. Provocative test launches from the North were countered by provocative “joint military exercises” between the South and the U.S. Add an American anti-missile system deployed in the South.
That the People’s Republic of China would cooperate only so far with Washington coupled with Russia’s dramatic animosity to the United States (opening ferry services between the North and Russia) meant when push came to shove, Kim’s nuclear engineers could always get “enough” to continue their nuclear weapons/advanced missile systems without interruption. The threat of the North assisting other rogue states – he purportedly provided technical assistance to Syria’s nuclear facility in Al Kibar – is also a very real additional risk to us all.
With highly mobile missile platforms and scattered nuclear research/production facilities deep underground, Kim seemed to believe that nothing short of a nuclear holocaust – one that would collaterally kill hundreds of thousands if not millions in both South Korea and China (an untenable risk to the United States) with nuclear fallout for the entire region – could terminate his weapons programs. And there was an equal risk that Kim actually could launch one or more missile strikes on U.S. targets before the American nukes hit, noting that U.S. anti-missile tests were hardly 100% effective. The stalemate was deteriorating rapidly with no good solutions in sight.
The Winter Olympics opened a crack in the door. The South and the North moved towards détente. High level visits between the nations were next, rapidly followed by a stunner: Donald Trump declared he was ready to meet with Kim Jong-un. The North seemed to accept but for the most part went radio-silent. Sweden intervened as a facilitator. Many were skeptical that the meeting would take place. Donald had given Kim the recognition the latter sought just by announcing the possibility of a meeting – Kim was being treated as a worthy world leader – without much of anything in return. Trump continued to juggle his cabinet around, purging international expertise and particularly decimating his diplomatic capacity. Did Trump even know what to do?
Hardliner, Mike Pompeo, was named Secretary of State (designate until Senate confirmation), a past advocate of a military solution to denuclearize the North, a difficult posture in light of the above risks. Trump still did not pull back on the potential meeting with Kim. But there was a new “bad cop” in the room? The South also needed to send a message to Washington that it was not abandoning a tough stance against the North entirely. Annual early April joint U.S./South Korean military exercises were put back on the schedule. Was Trump backpedaling or just pointing out the obvious alternatives to Kim?
So let’s assume that these negotiations actually take place in the not-too-distant future. What is possible? What has history taught us about the effectiveness of negotiations? The North has consistently demanded to be treated as a nuclear power, while the United States has insisted on fully denuclearizing Pyongyang. Is there anything in-between that could create an American détente with North Korea? Joseph DeTrani, former U.S. Special Envoy for negotiations with the North, fills in some background as well as possible middle ground in these words from the March 21st The Cipher Brief:
[Recent History] On September 19, 2005, North Korea signed a Joint Statement committing the North to the dismantlement of all of its nuclear programs, in return for security assurances, a peace treaty, economic development assistance and, when North Korea returned to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state, a discussion on the provision of two civilian Light Water Reactors.
Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim Jung il, approved this Joint Statement, also signed by South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. The Joint Statement established a number of active task forces to oversee the implementation of the agreement, and also to discuss the establishment of a regional architecture for peace in the region. Issues related to bilateral issues would be pursued by the respective countries and North Korea. For Japan, a critically important issue was and is the abductee issue. For South Korea, reuniting separated families and other humanitarian issues.
The 2005 Joint Statement ended in 2009 when North Korea refused to sign a monitoring and verification protocol that would have permitted nuclear monitors to leave the Plutonium facility at Yongbyon to inspect other non-declared facilities to ensure compliance with the North’s dismantlement commitments.
Since 2009, there has been minimal official contact with North Korea. In 2009, former President Bill Clinton traveled to Pyongyang to secure the release of two women journalists being held in North Korea. In 2015, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper visited North Korea to bring home two American prisoners. And in 2017, former Special Representative to North Korea Joe Yun visited Pyongyang to escort a gravely ill college student, Otto Warmbier, back to the U.S.; Warmbier died shortly thereafter. That has been the extent of our official interaction with North Korea. There are three Americans still being held there.
Kim Jong Un took over from his father, Kim Jung il, in December 2011, when the senior Kim died from an apparent heart attack. Since that time, Kim Jong Un has focused his nation’s scarce resources on its nuclear and missile programs. In 2017, 25 ballistic missiles were launched, to include an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the continental U.S. In September, the North tested a reported hydrogen bomb…
[Possible Middle Ground] During two years of intense negotiations with North Korea, from August 2003 to September 2005, North Korea’s constant refrain to U.S. negotiators was, ‘Accept us as a nuclear weapons state and we’ll be a good friend of the U.S.’… Kim Jong Un would establish his legacy if he could normalize relations with the U.S.
If Kim Jong Un is convinced that this would never happen, then Kim may revert to plan B: Get the U.S. to agree to a cap on the number of nuclear weapons the North can retain, promising not to manufacture any additional fissile material or weapons. Kim may think that plan B is attainable, with time and perseverance.
There are so many questions – even if the parties could agree – particularly those that revolve around monitoring and enforcement within a highly secretive country. The North wants a one-on-one with the United States alone, but that would be a mistake for us. At a minimum, regional Asian powers are essential, and perhaps the mantle of a United Nations’ imprimatur is equally necessary.
DeTrani adds this observation: Trump made a bold decision to accept Kim Jong Un’s invitation for a meeting. Since 2003, North Korea’s negotiators repeatedly asked that the U.S. president agree to a meeting with their leader. They said such a meeting would expeditiously resolve all issues between our countries and obviate the need for these protracted negotiations. They were told a meeting with the president possibly would follow an agreement. North Korea now has the opportunity to prove that they were right – that a meeting with Trump will lead to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs. The die is cast, and if that meeting does in fact take place, we just might drop the level of nuclear confrontation one giant notch downwards. The United States lived with harsh nuclearized enemies during the Cold War before. Is this different? The North has significant numbers of nuclear weapons right now! Time will tell.
I’m Peter Dekom, and Donald Trump has a unique opportunity to create one of the most significant steps towards world peace, a legacy that to date he seems to have avoided.
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