One Man’s Poison is Another Man’s Pride

To the Russian people, the fact that their government – wink, wink – was so obviously able to influence an American election (not to mention elections all over Europe as well), so completely able to use shameless and rather insincere flattery to manipulate an American president and perhaps that it may well have more than a few photographs or recordings that could seriously compromise America’s leader… well frankly, that just makes the average Russian beam with pride. It’s rather clear proof to a majority of Russians of the superiority of their nation, their leader, over the hapless America.

Indeed, despite a GOP effort to make it look like Donald Trump is the sole cause of the Korean détente efforts, hence he should be an obvious choice for the Nobel Peace Prize, the United States has never been more estranged from its European and North American “allies” and their goals and priorities. This makes Russia very, very happy. Notwithstanding the joint US/EU continuation of sanctions because of Russian activities in Ukraine and their annexation of Crimea, the Russians are overjoyed at the schism that “America First” Trump has driven between the U.S. and its traditional allies. Vladimir Putin is delighted that maintaining the Iran nuclear deal, so revered by the EU signatories (UK, France and Germany) and the U.N., is driving an even bigger wedge between the U.S. and those nations.

To understand the length and breadth of Russian capacity to meddle in and otherwise influence elections in the West, from garden variety hacking (which interferes with equipment while often generating embarrassing information that can dislodge otherwise powerful candidates) to the dissemination of false information about candidates who are not Russia-friend, it is valuable to look at other nations and their experience with Russian meddling.

Here are some thoughts, for example, from Estonia’s Director General of their Foreign Intelligence Service, Mikk Marran (from the May 2^nd The Cipher Brief): “Russian influence operations were thrust into the public limelight in the West in 2017 with the findings of the U.S. Intelligence Community that Russia did in fact, interfere with U.S. Elections. The resulting attention did not deter the Kremlin; on the contrary – it takes pride in it. From the Kremlin point of view, influence operations are cheap, reliable and essential. The Kremlin believes that creating confusion that splits unity and trust among Western countries will give Russia greater freedom of action, and the ability to shape decisions more favorably on its terms. Since Russia lacks soft power [people distrust direct Russian efforts], it is quite dependent on covert influence operations.

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) has focused on Russia for the past quarter century. Over that period of time, the EFIS has, among other topics, thoroughly investigated the intent and capabilities of Russian influence operations. In order to have the capability to influence Western decision-making processes and public opinion, Putin’s regime focuses on two, mutually enforcing fronts; first, by creating a network of agents of influence, and second, by further developing the capability of its information operations. For the democratic world, Russia’s efforts mean more hostile (dis)information campaigns in the future, and more attempts to recruit our citizens.

Russia is constantly targeting Western politicians, journalists, academics, and diplomats in order to expand its network of influence agents. The task of these ‘partners’ is two-fold – promoting the Kremlin´s interests in the West, and strengthening and legitimizing Putin´s domestic position. They are a tool to make attractive political statements according to a Kremlin narrative, shape Western decision-making processes in favor of Russia, or simply to aid the spread of disinformation.

Russia is playing a long game, hoping that it will lead to the rise of pro-Russian governments in Europe. Recruiting surrogates abroad almost always includes an element of corruption, beyond ideology or straight blackmail. The Russian intelligence services know our counter-espionage tactics, and therefore the Kremlin is using its Duma deputies as proxies to make contact and recruit aspiring politicians in the West. A lot of effort is put into keeping the officers of Russian intelligence services as hidden as possible in handling foreign influence agents…

What does the Kremlin have to offer when recruiting agents of influence? The support is mainly political and financial; for example, high-level meetings with Russian leaders and businessmen are offered, and exclusive access to the Russian market. Some agents receive media and campaign support, and for most it means earning easy money. Of course, there is also a place for classic tricks of deception and blackmail.

In the spirit of the recent adage that modern war involves 80 percent influence operations and 20 percent violence, while the reverse was the norm in the 20th century, the Kremlin believes that superiority in information operations will decide the global power struggle. To implement this vision, the Russian armed forces have established information warfare units in each military district. For example, the main target for the Western Military District information warfare unit is NATO and its member states. The purpose of these units is to undermine the adversary´s resistance before a military conflict and to maintain a dominant position once it has begun. It is important to note that the Kremlin doesn’t draw a distinction between peacetime and wartime; the informational confrontation is constant. The capabilities of these units are uneven; one may say they are currently weak. Still, with the determination inherent to the military and with the help of experience from GRU psychological operations, we may witness another wave of disinformation campaigns directed against our defense forces, population, and governments.

Do we predict any change? No. The internal situation in Russia can be briefly summarized as ‘stagnation,’ which Putin frames as ‘stability.’ The main goal for the ruling elite is to hold onto power as long as possible. There is no appetite for reforms or any major changes in domestic or foreign policy, which means that an adversarial stance towards the West will continue in a long standoff.

Donald Trump is a fantasy president for Russia, especially Trump’s refusing to implement Congressional sanctions against Russia, glad-handing and complimenting Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin, literally congratulating the Russian leader at his recent “election victory” when no other Western leader did and generally reflecting a rather cavalier attitude about America’s long-term global foe. The newly identified $500K Russia connection through Trump lawyer, Michael Cohen, certainly looks bad. But whether or not the President of the United States himself “colluded” with Russia in the latter’s meddling in the 2016 election or not, Russia got the man they wanted as President. And he has delivered for them in spades.

I’m Peter Dekom, and despite even serious high-level GOP disdain for Trump obvious pro-Putin bent and the obvious negative consequences for the United States, it doesn’t seem to matter whether Trump directly colluded with Russia vis-à-vis the election; the results of Trump’s pro-Russian efforts scream for themselves.