Sunday, October 2, 2022

Putin’s Pressure

 Men in suits shaking hands

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"It is very important for people to have a chance    

 to chill out with their family and friends." 

    Vladimir Putin at the dedication of a massive 

    Ferris wheel in Moscow in early September

Men sitting at a table

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Macron/Putin meeting early in 2022

Putin promised a quick subjugation of Ukraine, literally days. He failed. He told the Russian people that his forces would be welcomed as liberators. They weren’t. He made it clear that he was extracting the same enemies Russia faced in WWII, Nazis, from governing Ukraine. Despite continued claims to the contrary, there weren’t any. He indicated that his existing military capacity was more than enough to take down Ukraine, that no general mobilization would be necessary. For the third time since 1917 (WWI, WWII being the first two), Putin ordered such a mobilization (which he labeled as “partial”) to replace Russian troops at the front, triggering widespread dissent. Putin maintained that his forces only attacked military targets, that any purported war crimes against Ukrainian people, were either fake new or self-inflicted false flag efforts. Recent UN investigation of mass graves found in recaptured lands in eastern Ukraine has made a preliminary determination of Russian war crimes. Ubiquitous video footage shows massive destruction of civilian targets.

Putin’s isolation, amplified by the above visual of his very long desk with dignitaries he was meeting sitting far from him, grew during the pandemic. The number of his close advisors shrank. Already a one-man-show with virtually no opposition (opponents were imprisoned or killed; protestors violently repressed), literally without any operational institutions to contain his ambitions – which even differentiated his administration from the Soviet era Politburo – Putin slid off the rails.

His inner circle – comprised of oligarchs whose wealth was completely controlled by Putin, technocrats (easily replaced) and military advisors (often a revolving door of influence) – contracted. Those who did not tow his party line were “removed.” Even the underlying political parties in Russia, seemingly different and competitive with each other, were all unified in support of the President. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church is his rubber stamp. Military commanders were replaced as the litany of battlefield failures mounted. Putin is now purported to be issuing personal field orders to officers in combat zones. It is now a crime for a Russian soldier to surrender. Mercenaries are being recruited from Russian prisons, and unlucky Ukrainian men in Russian-held eastern provinces are being conscripted into the Russian army.

Putin still harbors hopes that the NATO coalition will unravel after a cold winter without affordable Russian natural gas to heat their homes. As populist right-wing governments among NATO nations – Hungary, Poland and now Italy – or strong political factions (like Marie Le Pen whose parliamentary efforts in France have denied Emmanuel Macron an operational majority), question the NATO sanctions and the continuing need to resupply Zelensky’s military, Putin remains hopeful that the Western coalition against him will begin to reduce support for Ukraine. A right-wing surge even in the United States, the crush of higher US prices which would dissipate in significant part if the price at the pump would drop, also fuel Putin’s hopes.

For most Americans, the vision of massive protests in Russia (and Iran) seem to reflect the changing tides in the 1970s where protests ultimately ended our involvement in Vietnam. But with repressive autocracies, those protests have to grow to be vastly greater than what has ever happened in the United States – literally big enough to overthrow the government – to make a difference. Those autocracies are able to repress, shoot, kill, torture and imprison on a vast scale without long-term consequences. What we have seen across Russia, as draft age men flee and their families protest against Putin’s mobilization, is probably not sufficient to usurp Putin’s power. That Putin has pursued his sham referendum and annexation of captured provinces in eastern Ukraine reflects his need to show strength, to double down… which we view as his desperation.

But some Russia-watchers believe that Putin has violated his unwritten contract with the Russian people: give me power and I will give you stable prosperity. Yet there are no institutional means to remove Putin, and the Kremlin is guarded by super-loyal forces (a division or more of high-status troops, especially his inner guard). Many assume that if only Putin could be removed, the war in Ukraine would end quickly and peacefully. Maybe. But Putin is now being challenged not just by those who think the war is a mistake but by his own hardliners who believe that Putin could take Ukraine down quickly, even if that were to require the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Transitions in Soviet-era Russia were almost always orchestrated by a rising faction of the Politburo… but there is no comparable institution in Russia today. If for any reason Putin would suffer an “unfortunate accident,” a “serious, life-threatening medical problem” or even an overt assassination, there is no guarantee that the anti-war faction would assume control. If the hardliners were to ascend power, the situation in Ukraine could get much worse much faster.

Meanwhile Putin’s platitudes, his reassurance to his people that all is truly fine (hence his attendance at the opening of a giant Ferris wheel pictured above in the middle of failing military operations) and Russian media’s party-line release of disinformation and disinformation are still mostly intact. A little reporting confronted the mobilization effort, but support for Putin, voluntary or otherwise, remains strong. Even as allies like China and India question Putin’s war, Russia only escalates. Any possible path to a peaceful resolution of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is nowhere on the horizon. Nothing is likely to move that needle until spring.

I’m Peter Dekom, and as we attempt to wrestle with higher prices that neither political party can contain, the United States (and the rest of the world) are in for a very rough ride at least through this winter.

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