The Chinese Communist Party “represents both the leading and most consequential threat to U.S. national security and leadership globally… Beijing sees increasingly competitive U.S.–China relations as part of an epochal geopolitical shift and views Washington’s diplomatic, economic, military, and technological measures against Beijing as part of a broader U.S. effort to prevent China’s rise and undermine CCP rule.”
US Intelligence Threat Assessment Analysis to Congress in the Second Week of March
No one answered the military-to-military red phone when our Secretary of Defense called his counterpart in China to discuss the PRC balloon incursion into the United States, an atmospheric vehicle apparently laden with sophisticated surveillance equipment. As Congress discussed and debated this occurrence and relations with China in general, even as our dependence on imported Chinese manufactures has never been higher, a vast majority across both political aisles joined in a passionate condemnation of China, declaring that nation to be our greatest “existential” threat.
Really? Notwithstanding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the announcement of North Korea’s leadership of their focus on building a massive nuclear first-strike capability aimed specifically at the United States and her allies, and the rise of autocratic regimes worldwide inflicting violence on their people? Even Congress’ focus on the cause of the COVID outbreak did not deal with stemming future risks and ensuring that China’s malign silence and misdirection on the rise of a new virus, back in 2019/20, would be replaced by very necessary retooled and open communication. We focused on blame.
Are we blunting the real Chinese danger and causing that threat to become increasingly worse? Until the rise of China, and notwithstanding the efforts of Russia, the United States had been the sole global power on Earth. Using her economic might, through programs like her trade-oriented “Belt and Road” initiative which tied poor nations tightly to the PRC orbit, China flexed her economic power, often stepping in to replace US foreign aid that was increasingly domestically politically unpopular. China’s unabashed global espionage (economic and military, stealing valuable patents as well as defense secrets) was an internal priority to foster accelerated economic growth. China was growing, and her latest leader eliminated his political opponents, expunged term limits and established a PRC-centrist hardline on almost everything. President Xi Jinping was China’s new dictator for life. But China is now the other world power.
China likes to push the envelope. As US forces gathered over a series of naval exercises with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and garnered new space for military bases in the Philippines, China doubled down on her rhetoric that Taiwan was and always will be a province of China. Her military, in the air and on the sea, played increasing cat-and-mouse tactics with American armed counterparts, increasing the chances of a deadly accident that could trigger so much more. The PRC’s declaration of control over a vast area of the regional seas, exacerbated by her manmade expansion of an island in the Spratly chain into a full-fledged military launching pad, only drew louder. But was she learning any lessons from Russia’s failures against Ukraine? Was her pledge to take Taiwan, one way or the other, gaining strength or wisdom?
Indeed, Xi’s pre-invasion pledge to Russia’s Vladimir Putin of a Sino-Russian alliance with “no limits” initially seemed to falter amidst international condemnation against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, coupled with Moscow’s military catastrophes on the battlefield. But more recently, other than making clear that the use of nuclear weapons would be unacceptable to the People’s Republic, China has moved closer to Russia; she remains one of Moscow’s biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas and has been instrumental in furnishing all forms of non-military materials to Russia. Xi’s efforts to mediate a peace accord between the warring factions is viewed through skeptical eyes in the West. After the balloon was shot down, China made more noises about increasing its ties to Russia. The US iterated strongly that the PRC should not supply Ukraine’s enemy with any military aid.
“A subsequent discussion between Mr Blinken and Mr Wang [each head of his nation’s department or ministry over foreign affairs] in Munich was described as confrontational. America claims Chinese balloons have intruded into the airspace of more than 40 countries across five continents. But Mr Wang insisted that the balloon over America was for research purposes, and called the Biden administration’s response ‘absurd and hysterical.’
“The stakes of that squabble seem small compared with what is on the line in Ukraine. China does not care who controls this or that bit of territory. Its national interests lie in discrediting American-led defence alliances and sanctions, because its rulers could one day face a comparable American response over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Mr Xi calls Mr Putin his ‘best friend’ and the pair share a common loathing of Western liberal democracy. But their partnership is based on a cold-eyed calculus of Chinese interests. Russia is making itself useful by tying up America in Europe and creating opportunities for Mr Xi to woo those leaders in the global south who wonder why their countries’ woes do not receive as much attention as those of Ukraine. China also shares Russia’s desire to see a world run not on the basis of what the West calls ‘universal values’, but of the security interests of big states. Mr Putin may be brutal and his armies dismayingly incompetent, but China believes his invasion advances this worldview.” The Economist, Feb. 23rd.
The US has severely limited tech exports to China and layered additional economic sanctions against that country. We barely speak with Chinese officials anymore. We are more concerned with the impact of Chinese-owned TikTok on us than in attempting to begin to build better communications with the PRC – and no, they are never to be trusted or to become an ally – and finding away to deter aggression, prevent another probably more direct war with the United States and cooperate to stem global climate change that cannot happen without their complete participation. No, it isn’t in either country’s best interests to prioritize saber-rattling and confrontation as our frontline efforts against the other, but politicians on both sides are garnering a lot of domestic support for making the world a vastly more dangerous place.
I’m Peter Dekom, and while President Xi has been the opponent of democracy everywhere, not expanding our communications with him and all relevant Chinese officials not only gains us nothing, it puts us all at risk for a third world war.
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