For thousands of years, China had no equal… at least in her eyes. A country so vast – both population and land mass – has always been focused on its own magnificence, but politics and modern technology began to decimate and displace China’s perception of herself during the Manchurian (or late Qing) Dynasty – 1645-1911 – a period of open rebellion and serious military losses to the Western World in the Opium Wars in the middle of the 19th century and the allied response to the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the 20th century.
As my 2008 book, Handbook for an Informed American, reports, it is interesting that the word “China” derives from the first consolidation of central China in 221 B.C. (the Q’ing Empire, pronounced “ching”), but that word in actual Chinese means “Middle Kingdom” (read: we are the center of the earth, you are its periphery). Having faced conquerors and political change over the millennia, China at its core is not used to having other nations viewed as her equal, much less her superior. Until the late 19th century, Chinese emperors would not even receive a real ambassador because that would imply that there were other countries out there that should be treated equally; only “tribute” ambassadors were permitted (who brought gifts and paid homage to the Chinese emperor).
When in 1405, the famed Ming (1368-1644) Yongle Emperor – known as Zhu Di (1360-1244) – first sent his treasure fleets (the first use of water-tight bulkheads, making sinking his craft very difficult) to extract wisdom, unique wares and “tribute” from places as far away as South Asia and the African coastline, he was asked why he avoided the eastern Middle East and Europe, particularly around the Mediterranean. While Arab traders plied the Chinese coast, and while Zhu Di did find some of the regional (Middle Eastern) religious philosophy “interesting,” he looked upon Europe as “worthless barbarians with nothing to offer,” even though Jesuits were later imported from Rome to impart mathematical knowledge.
It is impossible to understand modern Chinese politics without this historical perspective, and China’s rise economically, politically, and most importantly, militarily, is reminding regional nations that “old China” is back. Vietnam, which began a litany of military struggles with China before the first millennium, has never been comfortable with this neighboring behemoth “bully.” Indian and China actually went to war in 1962. China has always that the Republic of Korea (Taiwan) is its sovereign land, and Chinese shell fire has rained down particularly on disputed island holdings. With China declaring itself to be the next major superpower, not all are comfortable in the Asian theater. Is this an opportunity for the United States – which is going through its own “Chinese rough period” in disputes over trade policy and currency reform – to reassert her “military umbrella” as a reaction to these Chinese “moves”… particularly China’s massive upgrading and expansion of its military capacity and technology?
The Obama administration appears to think so. The President took the first week of November to take this message across some of the major nations of Asia: “A whirl of deal-making and diplomacy, from Tokyo to New Delhi, is giving the United States an opportunity to reassert itself in a region where its eclipse by China has been viewed as inevitable… President Obama’s trip… his most extensive as president … to the area’s big democracies, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan, skirting authoritarian China. Those countries and other neighbors have taken steps, though with varying degrees of candor, to blunt China’s assertiveness in the region.
“Mr. Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India [signed] a landmark deal for American military transport aircraft and [discussed] the possible sale of jet fighters, which would escalate the Pentagon’s defense partnership with India to new heights. Japan and India are courting Southeast Asian nations with trade agreements and talk of a ‘circle of democracy.’ Vietnam has a rapidly warming rapport with its old foe, the United States, in large part because its old friend, China, makes broad territorial claims in the South China Sea… The deals and alliances are not intended to contain China. But they suggest a palpable shift in the diplomatic landscape, on vivid display as leaders from 18 countries gathered this weekend under the wavelike roof of Hanoi’s futuristic convention center, not far from Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum, for a meeting suffused by tensions between China and its neighbors.” New York Times, October 30th.
But the pièce de résistance of the President’s trip, presented in his November 8th speech before India’s parliament, was his strong suggestion that India be added as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council… a move that would place India at parity with China on that council. The U.S. was sending a clear signal to the Peoples Republic that any thought of ascending to the premiere spot in world politics was going to be anything but an easy and linear transition, even though the process of adding a new permanent member could take years.
Whatever the necessities of political balance, these alliances are essential to allow American interests to having continuing regional validity and to give us the wedge to keep China from running roughshod over our own domestic needs. This is not to say that Sino-American relations must sour and remain so, but to create a positive bridge to the Peoples Republic of China, it is always necessary to approach from a position of strength… never as a supplicant, never from weakness. Strangely, this seeming cacophony of conflicting political interests may actually signal the most positive element of our future relationship with the PRC. It is always a question of balance.
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