The Bomb I-Ran Away From

Nobody outside of Iran and a few fanatics wants Iran to join the nuclear community. No one! Not only is there the fear that Tehran would deploy such devices against Israel and even others in the West, but there is an even greater concern that she would “lend” such explosives and the underlying technology to clandestine terrorists and rogue states with bitterness and revenge on their mind. Experts envision an arms race in the region and perhaps other parts of the world as well. After all, could even Sunni states ever trust a Shiite military power with a nuke? There is no good that would come of such capacity, for sure. But we know all that. What would happen if Iran developed the bomb anyway and either an Israeli strike failed to dismember Iran’s nukes or no such strike were attempted? What would Iran with a bomb actually do with it?

First there is the argument that why should the United States, the bigger powers in the West, Russian, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel, have the bomb and Iran not? What, ask Iranian leaders in private, gives the West the hypocritical right to be nuclear powers yet insist that Iran not be able to join that club? Israeli leaders angrily respond with the Holocaust Denial and the pledge by Iranian leaders to push Israel into the sea. Yet it was the Bush administration that openly argued for ousting the current Iranian regime, providing aid to dissidents who shared that goal, hinting that it might do more if the movement looked as if it might succeed. It was indeed the United States and the U.K. that toppled the popularly elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in August 1953 and installed the profoundly unpopular Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi family (and their terrifying secret police, Savak) in their place, until the Islamists removed that regime in 1979.

In addition to featuring the results of our U.S. military simulations relating to a military solution to Iran’s purported nuclear capacity, today’s blog focuses on the analysis of Paul Pillar (above), a 28-year CIA veteran who served in the Bush administration (until 2005) as an intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, summarized in the March 19^th Washington Post: “Pillar, who teaches at Georgetown University, points out that despite all the ‘belli-cosity and political rhetoric’ about the issue, the idea of an Iran with the bomb ‘has been subjected to precious little careful analysis.’” Whether you agree or disagree with Pillar’s analysis, it would seem obvious that matters of such profound gravity – especially where a sudden and sustained spike in prices at the pump could decimate our own staggeringly slow attempt at economic recovery and that would inevitably result from an attack on Iran – merit some level of risk-reward thinking. Pillar has spent a good part of his life focused on understanding the decision-making process among Iran’s leadership.

Simply put, Pillar believes that an Iran with the bomb would not be much more dangerous than most other nuclear powers. Were Iran’s leaders ever to deploy such a device – directly themselves or through their Hezbollah or Hamas sympathizers – their life expectancy from the retaliation would be measured in seconds. “He cites the repeated stereotyping that Iran’s rulers are ‘fanatics who value martyrdom more than life, cannot be counted on to act rationally and, therefore, cannot be deterred.’ Pillar notes that the past 30 years have proved that although they promote martyrdom to defend the homeland, ‘they have never given any indication of wanting to become martyrs themselves.’

“As the CIA argued in 2002 about [Iraq’s Saddam] Hussein, Pillar says Iran’s leaders have no incentive to lose control over a nuke. In Iran’s case, any use by terrorists would be traced to Tehran and bring swift retaliation. Tehran, he argues, would use nukes only in self-defense… As for making Iran bolder in supporting terrorist groups, Pillar argues that Tehran’s main reason for obtaining the bomb is ‘in deterring aggression against one’s own country.’

“Pillar also questions why the argument that any Israeli/U.S. attack on Iran to set back its nuclear program uses the ‘best case’ scenario that Tehran’s response would be limited, while only a ‘worst case’ analysis is made of Iran getting the bomb. If the armed attack by Israel or the United States is analyzed under ‘worst case’ scenarios, Pillar says, ‘we would be hearing about a regional conflagration involving multiple U.S. allies, sucking in U.S. forces beyond the initial assault.’… He said such an attack also ‘would be an immediate political gift to Iranian hard-liners.’… An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities of course would disrupt oil markets and raise gas prices. Look at what just the threat of such an attack is doing.” The Post.

Aside from Paul Pillar, the U.S. military has recently played out a set of war game simulations – under its “Internal Look” program – based on the aftermath of an Israeli strike on Iranian targets. “The officials said the so-called war game was not designed as a rehearsal for American military action — and they emphasized that the exercise’s results were not the only possible outcome of a real-world conflict… But the game has raised fears among top American planners that it may be impossible to preclude American involvement in any escalating confrontation with Iran, the officials said.

“The results of the war game were particularly troubling to Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands all American forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, according to officials who either participated in the Central Command exercise or who were briefed on the results and spoke on condition of anonymity because of its classified nature. When the exercise had concluded earlier this month, according to the officials, General Mattis told aides that an Israeli first strike would be likely to have dire consequences across the region and for United States forces there…

The two-week war game, called Internal Look, played out a narrative in which the United States found it was pulled into the conflict after Iranian missiles struck a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf, killing about 200 Americans, according to officials with knowledge of the exercise. The United States then retaliated by carrying out its own strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities… The initial Israeli attack was assessed to have set back the Iranian nuclear program by roughly a year, and the subsequent American strikes did not slow the Iranian nuclear program by more than an additional two years. However, other Pentagon planners have said that America’s arsenal of long-range bombers, refueling aircraft and precision missiles could do far more damage to the Iranian nuclear program — if President Obama were to decide on a full-scale retaliation…

“Many experts have predicted that Iran would try to carefully manage the escalation after an Israeli first strike in order to avoid giving the United States a rationale for attacking with its far superior forces. Thus, it might use proxies to set off car bombs in world capitals or funnel high explosives to insurgents in Afghanistan to attack American and NATO troops.” New York Times, March 19^th. No one can really predict the consequences of such a military effort, but we have repeatedly miscalculated the consequences of our initial actions, often intended to create very short-term solutions but that result in conflicts lasting many years, from Vietnam to Iraq to Afghanistan. Military action is an extremely complex solution for the problem.

Yet the three Republican front-runners have indicated that they would support an immediate attack on Iran to suppress the nuclear effort (which has yet to be confirmed, by the way, and which many experts believe has not occurred), and the Obama administration has assured Israel and the American public that all possible options against Iran are “on the table.” There does not seem to be any governmental or potential governmental force of significance in the United States, and most certainly not in the current Likud government in Israel, that argues for a more moderated response. The only major relevant voices presenting the less militant view appear to be from our own military command and from those in the Israeli parliament itself, where their voices are becoming increasingly louder. Let’s hope the sanctions work, but if they don’t which side would you embrace? Are you willing to accept the consequences either way? Really?

I’m Peter Dekom, and when making exceptionally important decisions, it is mission critical to examine the assumptions, the options, and the probable results in full before acting.