Vendetta-ism

Ancient societies, separated by harsh topography, bad roads and primitive communications = tribalism. Early Islam exploded with militant (and military) fury through vast portions of the Middle East, North Africa and Spain and rolled with conquerors across central and southern Asia, but it also blended with tribes, some sedentary, many nomadic. Much of what we believe about Islam is actually tribalism practiced under the guise of strict adherence to Muslim principles. The religion “united” these peoples under a common belief system, but the topography, roads and communications didn’t improve much for many practitioners, particularly in the central Asian communities facing the harshest environments; tribalism was the only realistic governance for small communities far from any semblance of central authority.

And so it is with Afghanistan, a “nation” marked not so much by its international boundary than it is for the schisms of tribal control that truly govern most the country outside of the capital city, Kabul. We think of the Taliban – literally Islamic “teachers/students” – as a unifying fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam pushing an ancient and arcane form of literal Islam born in the 7^th century. But the Taliban in Afghanistan understand that the country is and will probably remain fractured by tribalism regardless of the “ruling” force that governs the national body politic.

At the root of tribalism is the notion of “getting even.” A village raids your village, and a vendetta is born. War lords gain strength when they serve this basic tribal value of getting even or taking advantage of weakened communities. Back and forth since as far back as anyone can remember. It’s just the way it is, has been and will be. Families themselves often fractured when one “uncle” thinks his uppity cousin needs to learn a lesson. Festering open wounds kept open and bleeding to allow those seeking new adherents to promise the one benefit that an angry villager understands: the means to extract revenge. The Taliban seem to know that very few of the people they are trying to recruit are attracted to a drab and strict version of religious abstinence, but they also know that the angry and the powerless can see the Taliban as giving them power… and weapons… to extract their revenge.

The April 19^th Washington Post: “In the rough borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the global war against the Taliban often boils down to a family feud, pitting tribe against tribe, son against father, brother against brother… While the Taliban leadership professes devotion to a 7th-century interpretation of Islam, many insurgents have far more parochial interests. They want revenge for an old grievance against their neighbors, or to settle a score with relatives… The local passions enveloped in the broader conflict help to explain why the United States and its allies have struggled for more than eight years to end the insurgency, without success. The tribal and familial infighting is not new, but now it has the veneer of a civilizational clash, with more weapons, money and recruits to keep the enmities fresh.”

When the Taliban support a vendetta with their superior military power, those who join win; those who do not often find their ranks decimated. The Taliban can practice their tortured ways at the micro-village level; this is their land, and they have been here for centuries. They know the feuds, the family schisms, and the local vendettas. Americans and their Kabul allies often do not. Taliban leaders know how to press for the advantage, buying loyalty often not born of ideology but of blood feuds. When the very notion of “Afghanistan” as a nation – “Pakistan” too in the Tribal Districts – has little relevance for the day-to-day existence of local villagers, isn’t it futile to fight for such national interests when the people really don’t care? Is there any realistic way for American policy interests backing a corrupt and unpopular government to prevail in a world of fractured loyalties and communities who cannot see beyond their visible horizon?

I’m Peter Dekom, and really looking at the situation can produce some very interesting and obvious conclusions.