A Question of U.S. “Strategic Ambiguity”: Will China Taiwan On?

It’s so easy to miss. There are political distractions everywhere. And it seems that unless a policy is geared to make it easier for American big business to make more money – regardless of the consequences – foreign policy is just part that vast “other” where Donald J Trump simply cedes his party line to “whatever appeals to the base.” The base wants to de-globalize, blaming their economic demise on that force (which remains yesterday’s issue, now replaced, and ignored, by the impact of automation) and flash our military might “the way we always have” to show the world who’s boss. China is grateful; she does not have to interfere with our elections like Russia to get her way. Trump is doing what China wants anyway.

You can read the tea leaves everywhere. At the meeting of the global elite in Davos, Switzerland in late January, Donald Trump played second fiddle to presentations by a senior member of China’s ruling Politburo, Liu He. “President Trump used the World Economic Forum meeting to woo investors and business leaders by reassuring them that ‘America first does not mean America alone.’ But it was clear in Davos, Switzerland… that geopolitical momentum lay with Beijing, not Washington…

“One of the best-attended speeches at the forum was that of Liu He, a member of China’s ruling Politburo, who promoted the Belt and Road initiative, also known as One Belt, One Road. Participants here said the Chinese initiative was already rivaling more established, traditionally American-led, international institutions.

“‘The China One Belt, One Road is going to be the new W.T.O. — like it or not,’ said Joe Kaeser, chief executive of Siemens, the German industrial giant, referring to the World Trade Organization…

“Belt and Road takes its name from the idea that Beijing is spreading its influence along the ancient Silk Road that once linked imperial China to the Roman Empire and to the medieval Europe of Marco Polo. But that was not the only push to extend its presence abroad that Beijing was trying to showcase… [Also in later January,] the Chinese government used a policy document issued in Beijing to call for a ‘Polar Silk Road’ that would link China to Europe and the Atlantic via a shipping route past the melting Arctic ice cap.

“Belt and Road has been a centerpiece of the foreign policy of President Xi Jinping, and his promises of a ‘China Dream’ of restoring his nation to past greatness. Unveiled in Kazakhstan in 2013, Belt and Road started as a plan to revive economic investment and diplomatic links across Central Asia…The plan gradually extended to include the Mideast, Europe and eastern Africa, with Beijing promising hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in highways, rail lines, ports, power stations and other infrastructure, much of it through loans from Chinese state-owned banks.” New York Times, January 28^th.

The message was clear: as the United States was withdrawing from multinational trade agreements – de-globalizing – and cutting back on its foreign aid commitments, China was stepping in with massive investment capital, available to any nation willing to play ball with China and distance itself from American priorities. As Donald Trump speaks of trade barriers, walls and new tariffs, China’s President, Xi Jinping, touts free and open trade. China is smiling as the United States simply steps aside letting her take over our waning global prestige and influence.

But China is growing bolder, well beyond economic policies. You can look at her efforts to build a military base on reclaimed land in the Spratly Island chain, a clear statement of China’s intent to exert herself as Asia’s main international power… at the expense of U.S. historical links to most of the region’s countries. And you see it in Beijing’s redoubled efforts to pressure Taiwan, the Republic of China (an island nation itself), formally to rejoin the Chinese mainland and become a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

Starting with U.S. President Richard Nixon’s opening the door to relations with the PRC back in 1972, the United States began a policy of purposeful “strategic ambiguity,” which technically accepted a fuzzy notion of “one China,” whereby over years (notably during President Jimmy Carter’s term) the PRC took over Taiwan’s United Nations seat while the United States somehow championed (with military support) Taiwan’s independence. But the Beijing never relinquished its goal of formal unification, perhaps mirroring its absorption of Hong Kong and Macau into the PRC. The 2016 elections in Taiwan were meant to send a message to China that the Taiwanese treasured their independence. Then PRC pushed back. The February 22^nd The Cipher Brief explains:

• ·         The landslide victory of President Tsai Ing-wen and her independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s May 2016 parliamentary elections ended an eight-year period of warm relations between Beijing and Taipei. Her pro-China predecessor Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang party (KMT) accepted the “1992 Consensus” whereby both sides commit to the “One China principle” meaning they accept that Taiwan and China are the same country, but tacitly agree to allow two different interpretations of what that means. Tsai’s DPP has never accepted the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen has struggled to balance the pro-independence elements from her party and pressure from Beijing that she commit to the 1992 Consensus by insisting that she supports the “status quo,” neither independence nor reunification.
• ·         Beijing has not trusted Tsai Ing-wen’s purported commitment to the status quo and has pursued a series of moves to diplomatically isolate Taipei from allies and also threatened economic repercussions. After Tsai Ing-wen’s election, China’s Foreign Ministry put out a statement: “There is only one China in the world, the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will not brook being broken up. The results of the Taiwan region election does not change this basic fact and the consensus of the international community.”
• ·         Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) explicitly designated China as the island’s biggest security threat in a Dec. 2017 report, noting the increase in frequency of Chinese military activities, including 14 military aircraft exercises close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the second half of the year compared to just two in the first. According to the MND, Beijing conducted 26 aerial exercises around Taiwan, 15 of them actually encircling Taiwan. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) maiden aircraft carrier Liaoning also conducted four long-range exercises around Taiwan’s ADIZ.
• ·         On Nov. 25, 2017, six Chinese aircraft, including two nuclear-capable H-6K bombers, two Su-30 fighters, and two surveillance planes, participated in an exercise near Taiwan’s airspace, four of them provocatively circling the island. A week later on Dec. 2, then President-elect Trump received a call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, a break from decades of diplomatic protocol. Although a Taiwanese defense spokesman claimed there was no connection between the provocative Chinese air force exercise and the Dec. 2 call, Cipher Brief expert Gordon Chang said Chinese intelligence would have been aware of plans for the call to take place, and likely staged the military display as a warning.
• ·         On Jan. 4, 2018, Taiwan protested a unilateral decision by the Civil Aviation Administration Authority of China (CAAC) to allow the use of the M503 civil flight route connecting Shanghai to Hong Kong, which is 4.2 nautical miles from Taiwan’s airspace and puts Chinese airlines  at risk of crossing paths with Taiwanese flights. After the air routes opened despite the formal complaint due to aviation safety concerns, Taiwan responded by freezing an application from two of China’s airlines, China Eastern and Xiamen Air. But Taiwan’s protest to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) carried no weight because China is a member of the U.N. body, so had formal international approval for the routes. Taiwan does not have U.N. recognition.
• ·         China opened a similar route in January 2015, but when Taiwan protested, the two countries reached an agreement that one southbound flight route would remain open, and was moved further west. Moreover, China promised to consult with Taiwan before opening routes again. The difference between the two incidents is that in 2015, KMT’s pro-China Ma Ying-jeou was president. Breaking the 2015 agreement is seen as a purposeful affront to Tsai’s presidency.

Taiwan is looking over her shoulder to see what her support from the U.S. really means. China is counting on an inept and beleaguered U.S. President, rather unable to foist his will on the international community while alienating even his European and Canadian allies, to be unable (perhaps unwilling) to support Taiwan’s grip on independence against this PRC onslaught. Trump has been the master of mixed messages as The Cipher Brief continues its analysis:

• ·         In a Jan 13, 2017 Wall Street Journal interview, Trump said he was open to reconsidering the “One China” policy but later, in a call with President Xi Jinping, Trump expressed his commitment to it. After Trump’s Mar-a-Lago summit with Xi in April, his tone appeared to have changed even more.  When asked in an interview with Reuters about another call with the Taiwanese president, Trump responded that he had “a very good relationship with President Xi… and would want to speak to him first.” At the time, Trump sought Beijing’s help with putting pressure on North Korea to roll back its nuclear weapons program.
• ·         A planned arms-sales package to Taiwan, originally to be delivered at the end of the Obama administration, was held in limbo for months as Trump continued to work with China on North Korea. The $1.42 billion package was finally approved at the end of June 2017. U.S. officials told Reuters that Trump had become frustrated with China over its inaction on North Korea and trade issues.
• ·         The mixed messages from Trump and the delay in announcing new arms sales have been cited as evidence of Washington’s declining reliability by both Beijing and Taipei. Taiwan’s May 2017 Ministry of Defense Quadrennial Defense Report stated for the first time that U.S. policy toward Taiwan “remains to be seen.”
• ·         In September 2017, Congress passed the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizing the U.S. to evaluate the possibility of re-establishing U.S. Navy port calls in Taiwan, making it a logical transit route for U.S ships conducting patrols and establishing a staging point between the East China Sea and South China Sea, both areas where the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been very active in recent years in asserting Beijing’s territorial ambitions…
• ·         Beijing lodged a formal complaint July 17, 2017 against provisions in the NDAA related to Taiwan. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said the provisions were a violation of Washington’s “One China” policy and represented interference in China’s internal affairs: “We urge the United States to fully recognize the serious harmfulness of the relevant clauses in the act, and should not allow them into law, and not turn back the wheel of history to avoid damaging the broad picture of Sino-U.S. cooperation.” He also protested the $1.42 billion worth of U.S. arms sales to Taipei, claiming it contradicted a “consensus” that Presidents Xi Jinping and Trump had come to during the Mar-a-Lago summit in April.
• ·         At a Chinese Embassy event in Washington, D.C., Dec. 8, Chinese diplomat Li Kexin warned U.S. officials that China would invoke its 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which allows it to use force against Taiwan if necessary to prevent the island from seceding, should U.S. ships make port calls to Taiwan: “The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force.” The 2018 NDAA — which could make those port visits possible — was signed into law by Trump on Dec. 12.

China sees Trump as indecisive, constantly contradicting his own policy statements and undermining the diplomatic efforts of an effectively emasculated Secretary of State. Exactly what will the Trump administration do with Beijing’s obvious momentum against Taiwan? China is notorious for saber-rattling and pushing to the brink… before backing off. But they just might see Donald Trump’s bumbling as an opportunity they have never had before. With large chunks of Asia realigning their connectivity away from the United States and in favor of China, the future of this “one China” policy is very much up in the air.

I’m Peter Dekom, and the world and its political-economic-religious realities are profoundly interrelated, no matter how de-globalized Trump and his base might wish otherwise.