Monday, December 9, 2019
Trump’s Misfire of a Weaponized Dollar
Although the US dollar is not the
world’s reserve currency, it is clearly the world’s major reserve
currency. Valuation and financial metrics are heavily reliant on the perceived
stability of the dollar, the underlying legal US system and our institutional capacity
to handle the trillions of dollars of transactions that are measured and
implemented in global trade. No other economy on earth has that capacity… at
least not so far. Many other nations maintain massive foreign currency
reserves, most of which are dollar denominated.
Clearly, the dollar’s visible strength against
most other currencies is in significant part attributable to its ubiquitous
presence in global trade. The standard bearer for so much of the world’s
transnational business flow.
That status is not necessarily
without detriments, however. One of the hallmarks of maintaining the global
primary reserve currency reserve is an ability and willingness to deal with
account surpluses, but mostly to tolerate account deficits. If you think of
holders of US currency as holding little notes from the US government to them,
you begin to understand the issue. We owe money!
Marshall Gittler, FX
(foreign exchange) strategist & financial commentator (writing for Quora.
Com) gets a bit more technical: “In
order to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, [foreign] central banks buy
assets (mostly government bonds) denominated in the currencies of other
countries. In this case, we have foreign central banks buying billions and
billions of dollars worth of US government securities. This causes
the US to run a financial account surplus. (A financial
account surplus means foreigners buy more USD-denominated assets than US-based
investors buy in foreign assets.)
“If the US runs a financial account surplus,
by definition it has to run a current account deficit [remember,
because we owe money to those holding US currency], unless the
government intervenes heavily. The current account is mostly made up of trade
in goods & services. (That’s because money coming in has to equal
money going out.)
“So the fact that the USD is the world’s major
reserve currency is one of the main reasons why the country has run a current
account deficit for most of the last 30 years. (This by the way is known as the Triffin dilemma — a dilemma identified in the 1960s by the
economist Robert Triffin, who realized that any country that dominated world FX
reserves would have a consistent current account deficit that would gradually
undermine the value of that currency.)
“To put it in simpler terms, if the USD
weren’t the world’s major reserve currency, probably its value would have
fallen, US exports would be more competitive, and more people in the US would
have jobs making goods for exports. On the other hand, probably fewer people in
China, Germany and Mexico would have jobs making things for export to the US.
Do you think that’s a good thing or a bad thing? Probably your view on this
depends on whether you work in a factory in the US or China.”
But as the owner of that currency, we have a
political badge of honor that carries with it more than its share of
responsibility. We probably will never mount a balance of trade equilibrium as
long as we are the primary reserve currency, but a strong dollar lets us buy
foreign goods and services at much more affordable prices, and the less the
dollar is used at that primary metric, that primary trading currency, the less
relative value it will have. Likewise, our ability to dominate international
financial markets and effectively be the power in international trade would be
diluted.
Enter Donald Trump. Not only have his erratic
economic policies destabilized the perceived value of the dollar in
international financial markets, including the stability of the underlying
legal system, but his willingness to “weaponize” the dollar through tariff wars
and imposing economic sanctions for political goals has provoked a reaction in
the two other major economic forces in the world, China and the European Union:
unless they want to be beholden to erratic Donald Trump or his successor, they
must seriously consider diluting the dollar’s relative power in global markets.
Somehow, they reason, either their currencies must rise as acceptable
alternative primary reserve currencies or a new blended reserve currency, where
the dollar is just one of the underlying currencies so blended, must be
established. Should either of these alternatives be implemented, you can be
certain that the dollar will weaken while the cost foreign goods and
commodities (especially oil, even if it is generated from US source) will rise.
Ouch!
China has yet to cave to Trump’s trade demands,
despite the pain. But when it comes to US domination of international trading
standards, we know what China wants. But the PRC needs more exposure buying
foreign goods (beyond oil and foodstuffs) and more rigorous financial
institutions to qualify. Someday. Not now, although it could use its
debt-imposing Belt and Road initiative to force borrowing countries to accept
the yuan/renminbi as a primary reserve currency. The European Union, on the
other hand, just might have the wherewithal to pull it off, and Donald Trump
has so angered the EU that they just might be the ones to tackle the dollar.
Martin Sandbu, writing for the December 9th
Financial Times (UK), explains how European ire just might have lit the fuse
for an explosive reconfiguration of the dollar’s status. “It took the whirring sound of the
helicopter blades on Marine One to reinvigorate Europe’s determination to no
longer be subservient to the U.S. dollar.
“When President Trump took off early
from the G-7 summit in Charlevoix, Canada, in June 2018 and abruptly withdrew
from a common communique, he left European leaders first ‘speechless, then
determined to work together,’ said Martin Selmayr, secretary-general of the
European Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker.
“‘Trump boarding the helicopter in
Charlevoix triggered the idea of European sovereignty,’ Selmayr said. ‘Promoting
the international role of the euro was one answer to that political moment.’… Just
months later, Juncker vowed to make the euro ‘play its full role on the
international scene.’ The incoming commission looks eager to pick up the baton:
Ursula von der Leyen, the new president, has included the goal of boosting the
euro in letters to her team.
“Since the start of the year, the
commission has been quietly working to promote the use of the euro in
cross-border invoicing, specifically for energy products. A clearinghouse has
been created to circumvent U.S. threats to exclude from the dollar system the
companies that trade with Iran. And the European Central Bank has been enlisted
to communicate the economic consequences of greater euro use internationally.
“As Europe looks warily to the
growing competition its main industries face from China and the increasingly
erratic leadership of its American ally, the role of the euro has become one of
the centerpieces of a profound rethink taking place across the region about how
it defends its own interests that include industrial policy and trade.
“For European leaders, a more
prominent euro is key to securing the region’s financial and monetary autonomy
and protecting it against U.S. attempts to weaponize the dollar through
financial sanctions.” Europe is quietly attempting a workaround to allow
trading with Iran, as the EU attempts to keep the UN nuclear containment accord
intact, that will side-step reliance on the dollar and US-dominated financial
institutions. If the entire reserve currency system can be upended, the impact
on the United States would be even vastly more substantial.
Further, once such a change is
implemented, given enough time to settle down, it is exceptionally unlikely to
get undone to restore the dollar to its former lofty position. There may be
additional currencies vying for primacy, but the dollar’s primacy will have
past. The change might happen slowly, but Trump’s actions seem to be an
accelerant.
Like so many of Trump’s missteps in
international and economic policies and his erosion of l trust and influence of
the US on the global stage, the damage will be permanent. The economic
ramifications will impact each and every American. It will not just be our
prestige that will drop even lower; it will be the economic quality of life for
most of us. The mega-wealthy and international conglomerates can adjust their
financial structures accordingly. They can move assets and money as needed.
Most Americans cannot.
I’m
Peter Dekom, and the deep anti-intellectualism that dominates the Trump
administration and so many of his supporters can cause deep harm to most of us…
because there is a failure to appreciate and understand these powerful economic
forces which are far beyond Trump’s ability to control, tweets to the contrary
notwithstanding.
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