A “failed, narco-mafia state"

Former Afghan Finance minister, Ashraf Ghani, used the above description for his nation, also calling it “one of the five most corrupt [nations] in the world.” The February 9^th issue of Newsweek quotes an unnamed Saudi diplomat’s description: “Afghanistan is not a nation; it is a collection of tribes.” More realistically, it is a nation of war lords, the largest faction – the Taliban – adding religious fundamentalism, funded by opium, to the list of its “qualifications to rule.”

With 70% of the population subsisting on less than a dollar a day, this country, which slowly sapped the powerful military of the former Soviet Union until that powerhouse collapsed, has a long history of defying and thwarting military sophistication though an impenetrable terrain, factionalism that seems impossible to unify absent a drastic and ruthless permanent force, and a population that is both primitive and mired in hopelessness. Opium is the national business and the only cash crop with any real “rate of return”; Afghanistan supplies well over 90% of the world’s opium-based drug trade.

Lust for money and power fuels regional tyrants; innocents are slaughtered as one war load challenges another for power. The Taliban are willing to apply strict rules (maybe not as strict as the system that brought them down after 9/11), “eliminate” these arbitrary local despots, and stop random acts of violence. The citizenry that had hoped for peace, stability and prosperity under an American aegis, is now willing to settle for relative peace, a modicum of stability and “infrastructure,” even if it comes with the price of drastic religious rules imposed by the most fundamentalist of Sunni Muslims.

Newsweek: “Last month, the sober and respected International Council on Security and Development reported that the Taliban ‘now holds a permanent presence in 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent a year ago.’ They are moving in on Kabul; according to the ICOS report, ‘three of the four main highways in Kabul are now compromised by Taliban activity.’” The American-driven NATO forces have clear military superiority over the locals, but even after they have cleared an area of insurgents, they lack the forces to hold their territory and build the schools, hospitals, infrastructure and jobs that would be necessary to effect meaningful change.

This “clear, hold and build” philosophy that was the hope for this devastatingly poor country is lost in a sea of corruption, exacerbated by a weakened global economy, and factionalism. Precisely what is the American “end-game” for this region? Can we “win” a war with a relatively modest commitment of troops (about 12% of our commitment to Vietnam at the peak)? And exactly what does “winning” mean? Eliminating the Taliban so that we have regional war lords to deal with? Reinforcing the hopelessly corrupt Hamid Karzai's government that was essentially created by the United States and effectively only controls the area around the capital, Kabul? Making a peace with the Taliban and accepting a less-than-optimal solution for the region?

And if we send “enough” troops to “clear, hold and build,” do we even more clearly define ourselves as “one more invading force” that needs to be crushed, slowly if necessary? Would be just creating one more effective Islamist recruiting tool? Can we even afford this course of action? Even at 60,000 U.S. troops, the price tag comes to a hefty $70 billion a year, with billions more for training local forces and building promised infrastructure.

If President Obama wishes to avoid another drawn-out conflict where the traditional view of “winning” has eluded so many other historical wannabe conquerors, he clearly needs to redefine America’s goals for the region… and given the costs, he must make the underlying decisions in the very near future.

I’m Peter Dekom, and I approve this message.