There is an inherent danger in too many spy/national security agencies from too many countries (sometimes even within the same country!), not completely trusting each other, tripping over one another in an ocean of vastly too much data. Pieces fall between the cracks… information from one country’s agency if added to data from another might easily foil terrorists with specific plans to hurt, maim and destroy. Sure we trip up lots of efforts, stuff we are never told about. Occasionally, a lone terrorist, acting on his own, has surprised the surveillance community – such as the recent attack in Sydney, Australia – but we just don’t get to see the vulnerable underbelly of failed intelligence efforts… until the passage of time allows the veil of secrecy to lift as news becomes “history…” or inadvertent history as much of this information comes from the analysis of Edward Snowden’s “big leak.”
We’ve been afforded a glimpse into one such colossal failure – the November 2008 merciless attack by Pakistani-sympathetic terrorists (the Lashkar-e-Taiba group) who rained violence across Mumbai, India, focusing on luxury hotels and a Jewish hostel, killing 166 people (including 6 Americans) – as documents are finally being made public (one way or the other). It’s a story, covered by the December 21stNew York Times, that merits review by us all. The mastermind of the attack, gleaning information at to attack routes via Google Earth, figuring out how to create false-sourcing (New Jersey was the false site) on the terrorists’ Web-linked telecommunications traffic, was Pakistani technologist, Zarrar Shah.
Shah roamed fairly freely through Pakistan’s Western Tribal Districts and into lands bordering the Arabian Sea. British intelligence was already tracking his efforts months before the attack. Separately, according to information leaked by Mr. Snowden, American generated their information both from electronic eavesdropping and their own “humans” sources. Indian intelligence had glimmers of the plot but insubstantial specific information to thwart the attack. The problem was, these agencies weren’t sharing their information, which, if pieced together, would have presented a sufficiently clear picture of the planned event to allow official agencies to arrest the perpetrators before the mayhem ensued. It was only in the post-mortem that the agencies aggregated and shared their intelligence, a gesture that had to frustrate everyone.
“The British had access to a trove of data from Mr. Shah’s communications, but contend that the information was not specific enough to detect the threat. The Indians did not home in on the plot even with the alerts from the United States.
“Clues slipped by the Americans as well. David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American who scouted targets in Mumbai, exchanged incriminating emails with plotters that went unnoticed until shortly before his arrest in Chicago in late 2009. United States counterterrorism agencies did not pursue reports from his unhappy wife, who told American officials long before the killings began that he was a Pakistani terrorist conducting mysterious missions in Mumbai…
“[The NY Times] account has been pieced together from classified documents, court files and dozens of interviews with current and former Indian, British and American officials. While telephone intercepts of the assault team’s phone calls and other intelligence work during the three-day siege have been reported, the extensive espionage that took place before the attacks has not previously been disclosed. Some details of the operations were withheld at the request of the intelligence agencies, citing national security concerns. ‘We didn’t see it coming,’ a former senior United States intelligence official said. ‘We were focused on many other things — Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the Iranians. It’s not that things were missed — they were never put together.’
“After the assault began, the countries quickly disclosed their intelligence to one another. They monitored a Lashkar control room in Pakistan where the terror chiefs directed their men, hunkered down in the Taj and Oberoi hotels and the Jewish hostel, according to current and former American, British and Indian officials… That cooperation among the spy agencies helped analysts retrospectively piece together ‘a complete operations plan for the attacks,’ a top-secret N.S.A. document said.” New York Times, December 21st.
Intelligence operatives will tell you that they simply cannot follow-up on every lead, every hint or accusation of possible terrorist activities… there’s just too much information. Hard to tell that to the families of the 166 assassinated folks in Mumbai. But that trust is still lacking, and even when information can be passed on to the country where an attack is likely, filters on “who, what, when and where” that might divulge confidential sources prevent the necessary full disclosure. Sorry, we need a better explanation and better policy to deal with all of this cross-border intelligence.
“The attacks still resonate in India, and are a continuing source of tension with Pakistan. [In mid-December], a Pakistani court granted bail to a militant commander, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, accused of being an orchestrator of the attacks. He has not been freed, pending an appeal. India protested his release, arguing it was part of a Pakistani effort to avoid prosecution of terror suspects.
“The story of the Mumbai killings has urgent implications for the West’s duel with the Islamic State and other groups. Like Lashkar, the Islamic State’s stealthy communications and slick propaganda make it one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated terror organizations. Al Qaeda, which recently announced the creation of an affiliate in India, uses similar tools.” NY Times. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it… but if it is very broke, get to work!
I’m Peter Dekom, and in a hostile world with too many moving parts, global cooperation is no longer a luxury but a vital necessity.
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