Making the Status Quo Look Like Change

They called it the “Arab Spring,” a series of uprisings and protests that toppled dictators and unpopular incumbents, generated criminal prosecutions of those once in power, loosened constitutional reform in nations where monarchs ruled without check and in more than one case began protracted civil wars. In more than one case, Syria being the most prominent, brutal repression (Syrian tanks, turned on civilians, are pictured above), strict censorship and thousands of casualties, unmeasurable because of closed borders and a recalcitrant leadership, imposed continuation of the same-old/same-old.

Even in nations outside the Middle East, dictators were shaking in fear, sharpening their knives and looking for conspiracy to crush: “The authorities are engaged in the harshest crackdown [in Belasrus] of [President Aleksandr] Lukashenko’s 17 years in power. In response, Internet social networks have been promoting a new form of nonviolent protest, encouraging people to clap their hands in unison rather than shout slogans or hold signs… ‘We must strongly and consistently oppose the unconscionable scenario of the ‘colored revolutions,’ which are written as a blueprint in the capitals of other countries,’ Mr. Lukashenko said, alluding to the uprisings that led to pro-Western governments in Ukraine and Georgia.” New York Times, July 3^rd.

In the Middle East, there has been less than one might have expected from the wave of insurrection that swept the region. For example, in Tunisia, “The social problems that prompted the current unrest also continue to poison the transition process. Endemic unemployment and low levels of education could undermine Tunisia’s democratic transition. The school system, which has long hurt Tunisia’s competitiveness by favoring quantity over quality, desperately needs in-depth reforms. Meanwhile, more than 1.2 million Tunisians, over 11 percent of the country’s population, live in poverty. (The interim government’s estimates have placed the figure as high as 24 percent.)… [T]he flawed and lumbering legal system has not satisfied a population yearning for genuine justice. So far not a single dollar transferred out of the country by the [ousted Presidential] Ben Ali family has found its way back to the state’s coffers, not a single police officer implicated in the murders of almost 300 protesters has been convicted and not a single member of the ruling clan that fled the country has been extradited to Tunisia — including Mr. Ben Ali [who fled to Saudi Arabia].” New York Times, July 15^th.

Some incumbent governments have adopted a slightly conciliatory policy to maintain control. On July 1^st, for example, Moroccans voted in a new constitution aimed at curbing the power of its 47-year-old King Mohamed VI, who supported the measure and is considered a modern prelate. But the measures were not exactly earth-shaking: “The king proposed a series of constitutional reforms that, while stopping well short of the opposition’s demand for a genuine democracy, would shift power to an elected parliament. After elections, the monarch would be obligated to choose a head of government from the parliament’s largest party, and that leader would in turn select ministers and other senior officials. Parliament itself would be given more powers, and the judiciary would become independent. Constitutional language pronouncing the king ‘sacred’ would be softened.” Washington Post, June 20^th. Note that the king picks the prime minister from among the delegates of the victorious party. As monarchies in Jordan and Bahrain consider alternative means to control nascent democratic movements, Morocco’s experiment looms large, even as Saudi Arabia pushes hard in the opposite direction.

But in the poster child for reform, Egypt, the landscape was beginning to reflect less a transfer of power to the people and more a willingness by the power elite – personified by the military – to allow sacrificial lambs from the Mubarak administration (including the former president himself) to stand trial for their failed brutality in order for the old guard to maintain control. The people, sensing this betrayal, have begun to assert their power… again: “Chaos erupted in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on [the evening of July 3^rd], as a dispute between protesters and tea vendors set off clashes among groups of young men armed with rocks, clubs and knives, and a tent city occupied by protesters was burned to the ground… The clashes appeared to pit civilian against civilian, a departure from violence that flared in the square [on June 28^th] between protesters and the police, and pointed to lingering tensions in Egypt as the country negotiates a political transition under a provisional military government that has come under increasing criticism from the protesters.” NY Times.

To make matters worse, even the number of scapegoats the military is willing to sacrifice appears to be dwindling: “An Egyptian criminal court on [July 5^th] acquitted three former government ministers of corruption while convicting a fourth in absentia, verdicts most likely to further inflame public anger over the pace of efforts to hold former officials accountable for killing more than 800 people during the country’s 18-day revolution… The acquittals were seen as especially provocative because they followed by one day a separate Cairo court decision to release on bail seven police officers charged with killing 17 protesters and wounding 350 in the city of Suez during the revolution. That decision set off a riot at the courthouse and led protesters to block a major highway for hours.” NY Times, July 5^th .

The military has gone so far as to push for a new constitution that would literally ratify its obvious existing and continuing power: “[The draft constitution] will spell out the armed forces’ role in the civilian government, potentially shielding the defense budget from public or parliamentary scrutiny and protecting the military’s vast economic interests. Proposals under consideration would give the military a broad mandate to intercede in Egyptian politics to protect national unity or the secular character of the state.” New York Times July 16^th. Without giving up any real power, the military coalition offered to reshuffle the cabinet, a token gesture at best: “It is unlikely that [such] changes meant much more to the tens of thousands of demonstrators who had filled Tahrir Square since July 8 to demand more sweeping changes from the Egyptian revolution, most notably the criminal prosecution of the country’s former leaders.” New York Times, July 18^th.

Specifically, look at how Egyptian police leaders were punished for their responsibility in killing protestors: “The Interior Ministry said 18 police generals and 9 other senior officers were forced into early retirement because they were accused of killing protesters during the 18-day uprising. For the same reason, 54 lower-ranking officers were shifted to jobs where they would no longer interact with civilians, officials said.” New York Times, July 13^th. Hundreds of other senior police officials were retired as well. Hey, boys, enjoy those retirement benefits! True systemic change requires more than t he toppling of a replaceable dictator and a few of his cronies. The real power in charge has not changed.

With the exception of Libya, where American military intervention has at least given rebel forces a ray of hope in toppling the Kaddafi regime and where the U.S. has recognized the new regime as the legitimate government, these Middle Eastern democratic movements – even as they are supported by our government – are anything but pro-American forces. The U.S. is still seen as the country that supplied brutal monarchs and dictators with the military hardware to effect continuous control. But if you look closely at the reform movements in most of these countries – particularly at the reaction from the power elites – you may detect that there is less in the way of change flowing down the river of near-term history than may be depicted in the press. A whole lot less.

I’m Peter Dekom, and what’s trying and even executing a few former dictators if you can maintain your quality of life and virtual control over the economy?