Our Self-Created Vulnerability

Forgetting about climate change and out-and-out war, letting go of the polarization that is capsizing our political system, not focusing on our proclivity to cut the very government investments that make us great (education, infrastructure and research) – which cuts drop our global competitiveness day-after-day – but drilling down on those electrical systems that define our daily lives.

Our entire financial network is based on the interconnectivity of the Web, which is in turn reliant on hard-wired fiber and cable, satellite transmissions, and even the mobile connectivity eventually travels through those self-same wires. Our transportation system is built around sophisticated networks, interlinked, scanning and controlling the sky and commanding trains, planes (above) and automobiles on the ground. Our electrical power grid is not only a maze of high tension wires, below and above ground, carrying power where it’s needed, shifting vast surges of power as one region requires more than another… it is controlled by that incredible network of interconnectivity noted above. Nuclear power stations have their own issues on top of everything else.

We’ve seen repeated intelligence estimates on the vulnerability of our power grid and the Web, but we’ve assumed that the traffic control systems that are embedded with the U.S. Department of Transportation, in the direct hands of federal professionals, are well-guarded and “safe.” On Friday, September 26^th, the FAA’s regional control facility in Aurora, Illinois went down, literally in flames. The technical disruption that followed resulted in the cancelation of thousands of flights that were linked directly or indirectly to airports in this region. The slowdown and even shutdown continued for days and days as FAA officials struggled to find appropriate alternative solutions to this vital facility.

It was an arson fire, started by a security-cleared federal contractor, specifically by a very angry and depressed Brian Howard. As part of an intended suicide, Howard seemed to want to “take down” the entire facility that controlled a very good chunk of air travel across the Midwest. He was partially successful in his effort, and is facing serious federal felony charges. “Paramedics at the scene followed a blood trail to a basement of the facility, where they found a gas can, burned towels and the suspect, who was ‘actively slicing his throat,’ according to an affidavit posted by the Chicago Tribune…

“The incident raises questions about whether the government missed signs of mental illness from Howard, as it did with Washington Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis. Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) over the weekend called for an investigation of the arson by inspectors general at the U.S. Transportation Department and the Federal Aviation Administration, according to an Associated Press report on Sunday.

“A previous federal inquiry revealed that Alexis, a Navy contractor who killed 12 people during a rampage in September 2013, maintained his security clearance despite troubling police records and signs of mental illness. The findings exposed gaps in the government’s vetting system that still may not be entirely fixed.” Washington Post, September 29^th.

But this is a blog about complexity, millions of government contractors and employees, and the impossibility of perfect control of all of the participants. Some may be unstable. Some may be foreign agents. Some may just be incompetent. Even if the vast majority of those workers are deeply committed, well-trained and unquestionably loyal, it is impossible to insure the kind of complete security that most Americans expect. And within this maze of complexity, we get reminders of how little it really takes to bring one or more of these federally-protected vulnerabilities into an uncontrolled crash.

Couple this obvious flaw with an increased reliance on contractors (almost always more expensive than internally-controlled civil servants), budget cuts and the kinds of games state and federal agencies play by cutting their bureaucracies to look good to voters and then redoubling into another budget category: outside contractors. Back-up systems are costly, and budgets are thin. But if one man can wreak so much damage, think what a well-organized strategic assault on fragile electronic ecosystems, supported by extrinsic computer-hacking from foreign powers that happen every day, can accomplish.

We face crippling attacks a la 9/11/01, blasts and shootings from zealots and their sleeper cells ready to pounce when so ordered… but “war” is going to embrace attempts to cripple our communications systems, which too many of us continue to ignore. Private companies and the government itself need to upgrade their safety systems now. The current budget consciousness will pale in comparison with the cost of fixing the damage generated by our own complacency.

 I’m Peter Dekom, and each of us should ask the question of what we can do to help make these systems less vulnerable.