You Are the Weakest Link!

I’ve blogged about the internecine struggles within Iraq, from minority Sunnis hating majority Shiites (and blasting away at Shiite targets in Baghdad) and vice versa, to back-stabbing and undermining efforts of the former Shiite Nuri al-Maliki regime against his moderate, bridge-builder-to-Sunnis replacement, Shiite Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. I have described the seemingly leaderless Iraqi Army, unable to communicate with its troops in the field or even to resupply them with weapons and ammunition (not to mention food and medical supplies) when they actually do stand and fight. I’ve noted how many armored vehicles, weapons, truck and ammunition Iraqi forces have abandoned (as in Mosul) and left behind for ISIL troops to confiscate and take as their own. Iraqi turn-and-run seems all-too-common in battles between ISIL and the Iraqi military.

As the battle for the Syrian border town of Kobani finally shifted to oust attacking ISIL jihadists, it was not Iraqi troops that made the difference, rather Kurdish fighters with allied air support. You’d think that Iraqi forces would see that turn of events – that ISIL can be turned back with allied air support plus effective ground attacks – and rally to replicate that occurrence in Anbar province and against ISIL fighters gathered in the outskirts of Baghdad itself. But the Iraqi Army doesn’t appear to be engaged in this fight at any level that would constitute the slightest deterrent to ISIL.

Allied air support is missing in Anbar because there are virtually no truly active Iraqi forces on the ground to support. “Even as international airstrikes have factored heavily in allowing Iraqi and Kurdish forces fighting farther north and in Syria to make gains against the jihadists, the air campaign has been limited in Anbar, in part because Iraqi forces there have mostly stayed at their garrisons. American military advisers are increasing pressure on their Iraqi counterparts to leave their bases and seize the initiative, officials in Washington say.

“Exploiting the slow pace, fighters for the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, have aggressively pressed their campaign in recent weeks, commandeering towns and military garrisons along the Euphrates River Valley in Anbar, a vast desert province that stretches from the outskirts of Baghdad to the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.” New York Times, October 17th. ISIL controls some of the best remaining grain-producing land (in a region devastated by drought), able to feed starving farmers even as they brutally torture and execute anyone who opposes them or anyone with a faith in anything other than fundamentalist Sunni beliefs.

With rumors of ISIL beginning to train with captured Syrian jet fighters and with a clear and unsubtle hatred of anything Shiite, ISIL has its sights set on confronting both the West as well as the despised Shiite majority that nominally control the Iraqi government. And unless the Iraqi Army wakes up and takes to the field effectively, folks in Baghdad need to understand the meaning for the term “genocide.” The Iraqi military forces are well-armed, have sufficient state-of-the art weapons on the ground and in the air, but many question their leadership, training and will to fight.

Still, ISIL moves on with little stopping them in the vast Sunni sections of Iraq: “‘Anbar Province is in trouble,’ [U.S.] Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said recently. ‘We know that.’… As Iraqi and American officials have tried to rally the Iraqi security forces, efforts in Baghdad to achieve a more unified political front to face the crisis have also gone slowly. Iraq’s new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, has been struggling to gain support not only from minority Sunnis and Kurds — a process President Obama called critical to any military effort — but even within his own Shiite bloc. Despite weeks of wrangling, he has yet to fill the two crucial security posts in his cabinet: defense and interior.

“The Islamic State’s advances in Anbar Province, which is largely Sunni, have been a central concern for the Iraqi authorities since the beginning of the year. The militants first established a major foothold there in January when they seized the city of Falluja [remember how hard we fought to hold that town?!]. They have expanded their authority throughout the province, sometimes by force, but also by taking advantage of the profound disenchantment among Sunnis alienated by the government in Baghdad.

“The most recent string of Islamic State victories in Anbar Province began with the onslaught last month of the Saqlawiya military garrison, followed closely by the defeat of a detachment of Iraqi troops based in the village of Albu Aitha. The Islamic State also gained control of Hit, a town on the main east-west road between the Haditha Dam and the provincial capital of Ramadi, both of which the militants have sought to take… In those battles, the Iraqi military largely stayed on the defensive against a highly mobile militant force.” NY Times.

There is a bloodbath in the making absent a rather dramatic reversal of Iraq’s willingness to fight to defend itself. At some level, the fall of Iraq or even just Baghdad – and the expected genocide – will put increasing pressure on Western forces to add ground troops to the mix. Iran has to be watching all of this with a harsh realization that if Iraq falls, there is likely going to be a war with the Islamic State, a Sunni caliphate with global conquest as a goal. Iran and the West on the same side? Interesting.

Is this a lost cause? Will we be facing a new exceptional violent and hostile state in the Middle East, controlling cash-cow oil fields and seeking to expand globally, killing Westerners and Shiites where they can find them? Are we only making matters worse by letting the horror unfold without greater intervention, only making that future effort that much more intense? And what exactly does the Obama administration mean when they speak of a very long battle with ISIL?

I’m Peter Dekom, and I believe that the “too little, too late” syndrome is once again upon us.